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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the impact of environmental
agreements on member countries’ trade flows and bilateral trade margins. The precise
relationship between environmental regulation, the location of production, aggregate
trade flows and subsequent bilateral trade margins remains an open and widely de-
bated issue. By using panel data estimation techniques on a large number of global
environmental regulations and their accompanying standards, this dissertation finds
that environmental agreements and trade are reinforcing each other. Furthermore, it
also takes into account the differential impacts of agreements by category/size, and
pays attention to the heterogenous design of individual environmental agreements
when assessing their specific effects on trade.
After introductory remarks of the first chapter, the second chapter analyses the
consequences of multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on international bi-
lateral trade. To mitigate potential bias caused by the endogeneity, I apply a five-year
first-differencing method to examine the specific effects of environmental agreements
when simultaneously taking the effects of trade agreements into account. To iden-
tify the categorical impacts of both trade and environmental agreements, I divide
all complete trade agreements into two categories; (i) free trade agreements and (ii)
custom and economic unions, and environmental agreements into those dealing with
(i) pollution and (ii) natural resources. I also look at the differential impact of small
and large size MEAs on trade flows, and estimate an effect specific to each agreement
as a further robustness check.
xii
The third chapter focuses on the specific role of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) and accompanying regulations and standards on bilateral extensive and
intensive margins in international trade. Similar to the previous chapter, it uses panel
data estimation techniques along with a 1962-2000 bilateral trade flows data set at the
product-sector level and a full list of IEA membership along with agreement lineage
of 198 countries. The estimation results show that the tightening of environmental
standards between a pair of countries reduces trade margins to a small extent only.
To identify the specific deterring effects of different environmental agreements, I di-
vide all IEAs into three categories: (i) pollution, (ii) resource, and (iii) other. Small
effects for specific type of IEAs are confirmed as well. Such an empirical finding of the
small magnitude of negative IEA impact remains consistent with various robustness
checks.
The fourth chapter investigates the effect of one particular environmental policy
that introduces stricter regulations on sulfur dioxide emissions in China. The Two
Control Zones (TCZ) policy was instituted by the Chinese government in 1998. By
focusing on the amount of foreign direct investment inflows of 31 provinces between
1988 and 2012, I find that an average of ten percent of the provinces that have been
designated as TCZ areas have attracted about 26.5% less capital investment than their
non-attainment counterparts. Such a negative impact of the environmental stringency
on investment inflows in these provinces is consistent with various robustness checks.
However, ignoring the spatial correlation of provincial capital inflows leads to an over-
estimated policy effect. The subsequent spatial-analysis results further confirm the
presence of third-region effects in estimating the impact of environmental regulations.





The international trade literature has increasingly addressed the relationship between
environmental regulation and trade growth in the recent decades. While most free
trade agreements reduce bilateral trade barriers and to a lesser or greater extent lower
trade costs for multinational enterprises, environmental agreements are considered to
work in the very opposite direction. Despite several theoretical results (Taylor, 2004;
Copeland and Taylor, 2004) supporting evidence of the pollution haven effect, the
notion of a deterring effect of environmental regulations on trade, empirical evidence
of the negative impact of environmental stringency is quite limited. This dissertation
focuses on investigating whether a pair of countries signing an international envi-
ronmental agreement (IEA) would actually result in a decrease in their trade flows
as well as bilateral trade margins. It makes several important contributions to the
intersection area of trade and environment studies.
First, this dissertation uses the IEA Database Project by Ronald B. Mitchell
to provide a truly systematic, comprehensive and up to date list of environmental
agreements and their accompanying regulations and standards. Due to limited data
availability on existing environmental agreements and the endogeneity problem which
exists commonly in most assessments of the effect of environmental regulation, previ-
ous studies addressing the economic consequences of environmental regulations focus
on specific agreements and therefore have limited findings. The unique IEA data
enable me to take a large number of IEAs into account and test the general relation-
ship between environmental regulations and trade growth. Same as evaluating the
effects of free trade agreements, estimating the effects of environmental agreements
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using traditional gravity equation approach suffers from the potential bias caused by
the endogeneity. Following the panel estimation framework in Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) I use a five-year first-differencing method to alleviate the potential bias. As
results show, while trade agreements have a significant positive effect on trade growth,
there is little evidence of the oft-supposed negative effect of environmental agreements
which either have no significant effect or have a positive statistically significant effect.
Second, it also has a more detailed investigation of the differential effects of IEAs in
each category. By dividing IEAs into different categories: (i) pollution, (ii) resource,
and (iii) other, I find the categorical impacts of IEAs are consistent with the overall
effect. By separating all IEAs into sub-groups according to the number of signatories
specific to every agreement, I find small-size agreements with less than 26 (sample
median) signatories are more likely to have significant impact than the large-size ones
with more than 68 (3rd quartile) signatories. Moreover, this dissertation investigates
not only an aggregate impact of all IEAs but also an individual impact specific to every
agreement. By analysing both aggregated and individual impact of environmental
regulations, I find that a small portion of IEAs have had significant effects on member
countries’ trade flows, and when ignoring the heterogenous design of different IEAs,
such significant effects are likely to be absorbed by the rest of the sample in which
most agreements have had an insignificant effect.
Third, this dissertation is the first one to my knowledge that has been looking into
the impact of environmental stringency on bilateral trade margins, whereas previous
studies have been limited to aggregate trade flows. I follow the margin-decomposition
approach in Hummels and Klenow (2005) to construct bilateral trade margins from
each country pair’s yearly trade flows. My findings here are consistent with the re-
sults from the previous chapter: while environmental agreements and the regulations
and standards they introduce have a detrimental effect on trade in some cases, that
effect is small in magnitude. Specifically, even though the environmental stringency
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caused by regulatory agreements between trading countries would increase their pol-
lution abatement cost, and then reduce the trading volume on a particular sector
(intensive margin), the environmental cooperation between trading partners would
always be beneficial by stimulating incentive for innovation and green technology,
hence increasing the value-weighted variety of trading goods (extensive margins).
Finally, it examines the joint effect that global environmental agreements and
international trade agreements have on trade, by building on the panel gravity esti-
mation approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and mainly inquiring whether more
IEAs encourage or discourage the growth of trading volume between each country
pair that shares the agreement. Previous studies failing to control the trade effect
would face potential bias in their results. By simultaneously taking into account the
effect of trade agreements, my dissertation confirms that environmental agreements
and trade growth are reinforcing each other. Alongside with the globalized economy
and free trade development, there is a lot of concern with environmental agreements
that they are unfavorable to firms since most binding commitments fundamentally
increase costs of production. This can have a negative effect on employment and
many firm outcomes. In the sphere of international trade, binding commitments may
reduce a country’s comparative advantage and reduce its export potential, as their
firms have higher costs of production and are less able to compete on world markets.
After various assessments of IEA impact on trade flows as well as trade margins, I
find that environmental agreements have little effect on the extensive margin, so even
if the costs of firms are increasing, it does not drive them out of exporting. I do find
more consistent negative effects on the intensive margin, but they are relatively small
and not always present. So while environmental agreements do decrease the volume
of trade, the effect is small. And it is always more than offset if the two countries
have a trade agreement as well.
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The dissertation is structured as follows. The next Chapter1 starts with assess-
ing the economic consequences of multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on
bilateral trade flows between each pair of member countries. Following Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) I use panel estimation techniques to alleviate the potential endo-
geneity bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity. After taking a first step to estimate
the general impact of IEAs on trade growth, Chapter 32 uses the same dataset of
environmental agreements as the previous chapter and conducts a more detailed in-
vestigation of their impact on trade margins decomposed from aggregate trade flows.
Chapter 4 addresses the role of a specific environmental agreement, the Two Control
Zones policy in China, on the foreign direct investment inflows in policy treatment
areas. The last Chapter provides concluding remarks of the current work done and
an outlook to future research challenges.
1This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Tibor Besedeš, Xinping Tian, and Mingge Wu.
2This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Tibor Besedeš.
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECT OF MULTI-LATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS ON MEMBER COUNTRIES’
BILATERAL TRADE
2.1 Introduction
A central preoccupation of the international trade-environment debate is the impact
of environmental regulations on trade growth. In the past few decades, many countries
have placed great emphasis on meeting the dual goals of high human development
and low ecological impact. Various environmental protections have been adopted in
order to limit the emission of pollutants and to protect the environment. As a result
of increasing abatement cost for polluting industries, the pollution haven effect states
that a tightening of environmental regulation will have an effect on plant location
decisions and trade flows (Taylor, 2004). It is also known that lax environmental reg-
ulation in developing countries may increase their comparative advantage in polluting
industries.
Extensive research effort has been examining the pollution haven effect, both the-
oretically and empirically. Pethig (1976), Siebert (1977), McGuire (1982), Markusen
(1999), Ulph et al. (1999), and Millimet and List (2004) show environmental regula-
tions reduce international trade. Walter (1982), Pearson (1985, 1987), Leonard and
Duerksen (1980), and Taylor (2004) argue that stringent environmental regulations
could also decrease foreign direct investment. To better evaluate the impact of envi-
ronmental regulations, Ederington and Minier (2003) use environmental compliance
costs as a proxy for the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations and enforce-
ment from 1978 to 1992, and find empirical support for modeling environmental
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policy endogenously. They also provide an argument that, international cooperation
over environmental policies, by deterring countries from relaxing their environmental
standards, can actually lead to increased global welfare. In a later study, Levinson
and Taylor (2008) develop a theoretical model and test it empirically to examine
the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows between the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico, for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986 with an instrument
variable weighted by state characteristics.
Despite such a large and still growing literature on the puzzling relationship be-
tween trade growth and global environmental policies, few studies have been sought
to examine the effects of international environmental agreements (IEAs) due to lim-
ited data availability. None has been investigating the specific role of multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs), which serve as one of the most adopted measures
to introduce and coordinate stringent environmental policies in international trade.
An MEA is a legally binding agreement among several countries which implements
a new environmental regulation agreed upon by member countries. While environ-
mental treaties date back to the end of the 19th century, the vast majority of MEAs
have been adopted since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment (UNCHE)1 that took place in Stockholm, Sweden. Adopted by all 113 countries
present at the conference, the Stockholm Declaration was the first universal document
of importance on environmental matters. It placed environmental issues squarely on
the international scene and lead to a dramatic increase in the number of MEAs after
1972. After that, with the ratification of the Montreal Protocol (1989) and a series
of other conventions, the number of MEA signatories has also risen tremendously.
In the overall framework of setting up environmental protection laws and conven-
tions, MEAs have been playing a critical role in the recent decades. When a country
1Often referred to as the Stockholm Conference. UNCHE was a watershed event that helped
launch the last 30 years of increasingly intensive treaty-making in the area of international environ-
mental law as well as much activity within national governments.
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makes a decision whether to engage in a multilateral trade or environmental agree-
ments, it will compare costs and benefits that depend not only on bilateral economic
development, but also on bilateral political issues. Hence signing an MEA could elim-
inate the disadvantage in international competition caused by unilaterally imposed
more stringent environmental regulations. Such arguments are broadly supported by
later studies. For instance, Rose and Spiegel (2009) use a bilateral cross-section of
data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties to find that
multilateral environmental engagement facilitates international economic exchange.
Therefore, participation in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance inter-
national economic relations. In addition to their finding, Bergstrand, Egger, and
Larch (2010) show that countries are more likely to sign a trade agreement if they
are geographically closer to each other and of similar economic size, while Besedeš,
Johnson, and Tian (2016) find the same to be true for environmental agreements.
Egger, Jeßberger, and Larch (2011) investigate the determinants of MEAs and sug-
gest that international economic coalitions about trade and cross-border direct in-
vestment stimulate MEA memberships. Another recent work by Egger, Jeßberger,
and Larch (2013) proposes an empirical model of the number and characteristics of
specific MEAs regarding environmental issues, which involves their economic, politi-
cal and environmental determinants. For this purpose, they classify MEAs into five
different clusters of environmental issues: bio-diversity, atmosphere, land, chemicals
and hazardous wastes, and seas. Their results point to an overwhelming importance
of economic size and multilateral trade liberalization as drivers of MEA ratification
across clusters.
Several recent studies estimating the effects of MEAs on bilateral trade flows
take endogeneity into account. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) investigate the Kyoto
Protocol’s effects on international trade flows using matched pairs estimation dealing
with self-selection in Kyoto Commitments. They estimate a difference-in-differences
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specification including standard gravity variables as well as free trade agreements and
participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Their results show that Kyoto Commitments
have had a negative effect of exports. Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) derive a gravity
equation for the carbon content of trade and suggests that Kyoto commitment on
average leads to increased imports in committed countries. However, most of their
work focuses on environment regulation stringency in a single MEA (Aichele and
Felbermayr, 2010, 2012, 2013).
The objective of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it aims to examine how mul-
tilateral environmental agreements affect international trade. Secondly, it examines
the joint effect that multilateral environmental agreements and international trade
agreements have on trade, by building on the panel gravity estimation approach of
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and mainly inquiring whether more MEAs encourage or
discourage the growth of trading volume between each country pair that shares the
agreement. I also attempt to test the categorical impact of MEAs on trade flows when
taking free trade agreements into account simultaneously, which to my knowledge has
not been explored before. Besides various assessments of an aggregate MEA impact,
I follow Kohl (2014) to estimate an individual effect specific to each environmental
agreement as well.
This paper is distinguished from other papers in this literature in several aspects.
First, the basis of the MEA data is obtained from the International Environmental
Agreements (IEA) Database Project by Ronald B. Mitchell and the IEA Database
Project, 2002-2014. This truly systematic, comprehensive and up to date list (i.e., the
population) of MEAs include not only the agreements that counter pollution but also
those that aim to preserve the ecology and species. This work is the first investigation
on trade flows with comprehensive MEAs data rather than national environmental
regulation or single multinational environmental agreement. Second, by applying the
panel cross sectional time series data, I take into account the endogeneity of FTAs
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as well as MEAs. Furthermore, I separate the different types of FTAs to capture
the effects of trade liberalization rather than using a single dummy. I also separate
MEAs into the two types, pollution and resource management agreements, and take
into account the number of MEAs a pair of countries has as well. Finally, I estimate
an individual effect specific to each environmental agreement. This provides me a
more accurate estimation for the effects of MEAs on international trade flows.
The empirical results in this paper suggest several important conclusions. First,
while economic integration agreements (EIAs) have a significant positive effect on
trade growth, I find little evidence of the oft-supposed negative effect of MEAs which
either have no significant effect or have a positive statistically significant effect. Sec-
ond, I find that the simultaneous presence of trade and environmental agreements
increases bilateral international trade a lot, an economically and statistically signifi-
cant result. Third, to have a detailed investigation of the differential effects of each
type of environmental agreement, I separate them into two categories: resource type
and pollution type. I find that both types either have no effect or have a small positive
impact on bilateral trade flows. To see if the size of MEAs will have any influence,
I count the number of signatories of each agreement as well. I find that small-size
MEAs have more significantly positive impact than large-size MEAs. Finally, the
results of an individual-effect approach show that only a small portion (9.97%) of
the MEAs have significant impact on trade flows. I also find that small-size MEAs
are more influential on trade, which is consistent with the previous conclusion when
checking the aggregate MEA impact.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a detailed
description of the empirical methodology to assess the impact of environmental agree-
ments, following the panel gravity estimation approach from Baier and Bergstrand
(2007). Section 2.3 discusses the three data sources and related work. Section 2.4 ex-
plains the empirical findings of a general MEA influence and also categorical impacts
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on trade flows, from which I confirm the mutual supportiveness between MEAs and
trade growth. Section 2.5 provides additional robustness checks by separating MEAs
according to their number of signatories and, followed by further discussion in Section
2.6 of individual MEA effect specific to each agreement and concluding remarks in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Methodology
In this section I begin by reviewing the Baier and Bergstrand (2007) approach to
estimate the effect of trade agreements on international trade, which I then replicate
and extend to examine the effect of environmental agreements.
2.2.1 Estimating the MEA impact: Baier-Bergstrand (2007) Panel Method-
ology
Ever since its introduction by Tinbergen et al. (1962), the gravity equation2 has
dominated the international trade literature in studying the determinants of bilateral
trade flows. With its theoretical foundation developed in Anderson (1979), the gravity
model relates the trade value between countries to their size and the economic distance
between them. As pointed out in a survey by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the
volume of trade between any two countries depends not only on their level of bilateral
trade resistance but also on how difficult it is for each of them to trade with the rest
of the world-what they term multilateral resistance. Higher levels of multilateral
resistance should be associated, ceteris paribus, with lower bilateral trade volumes.
Recent theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms and trade emphasizes firm
selection into international markets and reallocations of resources across firms. Melitz
(2003) adapts a dynamic industry model from Hopenhayn (1992) to monopolistic
2The gravity equation is typically used to explain cross-sectional variation in country pairs’ trade
flows in term of countries’ incomes, bilateral distance, common language, common borders, and
for the presence or absences of an FTA (Trefler, 1993; Cheng and Wall, 1999; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, 2007; Anderson and Yotov, 2008; Egger, Egger, and
Greenaway, 2008; Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng, 2014).
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competition with heterogeneous firms in a general equilibrium setting. In so doing, the
paper provides an extension of the trade model in Krugman (1980) that incorporates
firm level productivity differences. Firms with different productivity levels coexist
in an industry because each firm faces initial uncertainty concerning its productivity
before making an irreversible investment to enter the industry. Entry into the export
market is also costly, but the firm’s decision to export occurs after it gains knowledge
of its productivity. Being concerned with the potential endogenous self-selection of
country pairs into EIAs, earlier studies use the instrumental variables approach and
cross-sectional data to account for the endogeneity bias.
Several econometric approaches have been applied to deal with the endogeneity
problem, inlcuding using panel data with fixed effects, matching econometrics, and
difference-in-difference estimators. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) apply a fixed effects
approach to eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of EIAs. Following Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) one can generate the following
panel gravity equation to estimate the effect of trade agreements:
lnXijt = β0 + β1 (lnRGDP it) + β2 (lnRGDP jt) + β3 (lnDIST ij)
+ β4 (ADJij) + β5 (LANGij) + β6 (EIAijt)− lnP 1−σit
− lnP 1−σjt + εijt
(1)
where Xijt is the bilateral trade flow from country i to j in year t, RGDPit (RGDPjt)
denotes real gross domestic product (GDP) in country i (j) in year t, DISTij is the
bilateral distance between the exporter i and importer j, a longer distance indicates
higher fixed trade costs from transportation; ADJij is a dummy variable which equals
to 1 if the two trading countries share a common land border (and 0 otherwise);
LANGij is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a common language is shared
between the two countries; and EIAijt is a dummy variable, taking the value to 1 if a
complete free trade agreement exists between the two countries in year t. Multilateral
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resistance price terms for the exporter i and importer j are explicitly accounted for
in lnPit and lnPjt. Ignoring the time-varying multilateral price variables might lead
to an omitted variable bias, hence Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest using the




= β0 + β1 (lnDIST ij) + β2 (ADJij) + β3 (COMLANGij)
+ β4 (EIAijt)− lnP 1−σit − lnP 1−σjt + εijt
(2)
where Yit (Yjt) denotes GDP in country i (j) in year t. Following Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), there might be unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables, as the source
of potential endogeneity bias, simultaneously affecting the EIAij existence and the
trade flows. These variables are best controlled for using bilateral fixed effects that
allow for arbitrary correlations of unobserved heterogeneity with EIAij. Previous
literature, such as Egger (2000), has provided econometric evidence for the support
of a fixed-effects gravity model by using Hausman Test to test fixed versus random
effects approach. Hence by taking country-pair (ij) and country-and-time (it, jt)
fixed effects into account, this estimation approach generates an unbiased estimate of
the EIA impact.
Another extension in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) to account for the unobserved
heterogeneity is the first-differenced panel gravity equation. Wooldridge (2010) has
pointed out that the individual-specific (i.e., firm, city, and country) trend is an
additional source of heterogeneity. Therefore the strict exogeneity assumption on the
explanatory variable for the random trend (or random growth) model becomes:
E [uit|xi1, ..., xiT , ci, gi] = 0 (3)
where uit are the idiosyncratic errors, ci denotes the country heterogeneity, and gi
is the country-specific average growth rate over a period, holding the explanatory
12
variables fixed. Since taking first difference to eliminate ci would lose one time period,
the policy effect could be estimated consistently in the random trend model only if
T is no less than 3 periods. It is expected that taking first difference would increase
the estimation efficiency because of the unobserved heterogeneity in country pairs.
Additionally, Cheng and Wall (1999) have argued that five-year differences are more
appropriate than annual differences, due to the likelihood that trade flows cannot
adjust within one year to EIA formations and that time is needed to capture full
effects, which is supported by the result in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) that it can
take 10 to 15 years for an EIA to have its full effect.
2.2.2 Estimating the general MEA impact
To empirically estimate the precise MEA impact on trade following Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), I begin with a set of five-year fixed-effect panel gravity equations as below:
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (EIAijt) + δit + ψjt + υijt (4)
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (MEAijt) + δit + ψjt + υijt (5)
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (EIAijt) + β2 (MEAijt)
+ δit + ψjt + υijt
(6)
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (EIAijt) + β2 (MEAijt)
+ β2 (EIA×MEAijt) + δit + ψjt + υijt
(7)
where TRADEijt refers to non-zero real trade flow every 5 years. Note that using
scaled or unscaled GDP value does not change the estimated results of average treat-
ment effects because of the inclusion of country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
I use bilateral (ij) fixed effects to account for variation in DIST, ADJ, and LANG
along with country-and-time (it, jt) effects to account for variation in real GDPs
and the multilateral price terms. Both the exporter-time δit and importer-time ψjt
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fixed effects are to capture changes in time-varying exporter and importer GDPs and
multilateral price terms over the same five-year period. Otherwise, ignoring such ef-
fects would cause potential omitted variable bias (Foster, Poeschl, and Stehrer, 2011).
Previous studies have shown that terms-of-trade changes tend to have lagged effects
on trade volumes. To account for the lagged terms-of-trade effects, I follow Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and add both 5-year and 10-year lagged terms into my estimation.
As discussed in Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the FD approach yields some po-
tential advantages over FE, especially when the unobserved heterogeneity are highly
serially correlated. Under such circumstances, the inefficiency of FE is exacerbated
as T increases. Additionally, as Wooldridge (2010) notes, if the data follow unit-root
processes (e.g., aggregate trade flow and real GDP in importer and exporter countries)
and T is large, the spurious regression problem can arise in a panel using FE. There-
fore, with a large-T panel (T=8 after five-year differencing in the sample), the FD
approach would be increasing estimation efficiency than using FE method. To avoid
potential over-rejection problems, I use clustered standard errors at the country-pair
level in each set of FD estimation.
Following the FD approach in Baier and Bergstrand (2007), I take a first step
to difference: (i) the natural logarithm of TRADEijt; (ii) EIAijt; and (iii) MEAijt.
Then I regress these differenced variables on all country-and-time dummies and pre-
dict the residuals. Finally, I regress the residuals from d lnTRADE on the residuals
from dEIA and dMEA, to capture the unbiased estimates of the average treatment
effects (ATE). The estimation equation is given by:


















where υij,t−(t−1) refers to white noise. Using such FD estimation allows me to account
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for the changes in the unobservable theoretical multilateral resistance terms d lnPit
and d lnPjt, therefore to eliminate the potential estimation bias.
2.2.3 Estimating the categorical impact of MEAs
After testing the general effect of all environmental agreements, I then separate all
MEAs into two types (pollution and resource) to examine whether there’s a significant
difference between each sub-category of MEAs. The “Pollution” category aims to
capture all agreements related to all forms of pollution, whether affecting air, land,
oceans, or freshwater systems at regional or global scales. While the “Resource”
category includes most non-pollution related subjects: Species, Nature, Habitat and
oceans, and Freshwater resources. In this work I do not take into account the last
MEA category, “Other” type, due to the limited number of MEAs in that category.3
Moreover, I also divide all trade agreements in the sample into two categories: free
trade agreements and custom unions. Following Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014),
these complete preferential trade agreements refer to EIA type equal to or greater
than Type 3.4 The estimating equations for each MEA type on member countries’
bilateral trade flows are:
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (FTAijt) + β2 (CUCijt) + β3 (POLijt) + β4 (RESijt)
+ δit + ψjt + υijt
(9)
where POLijt is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j belong to one
or more MEAs in pollution type and zero otherwise, RESijt is a binary variable
which is unity if country i and j share the natural resource type of MEA and zero
otherwise, and FTAijt is again a binary variable indicating whether country i and j
3“Other” refers to the rest of non-pollution related agreements, including “Energy” and “Weapons
and Environment.” These agreements seek to capture agreements that address energy production,
including nuclear energy, as well as weapons that affect the environments such as the nuclear bomb
as well as bacteriological, chemical, and toxin weapons.
4In EIA dataset, Type 1 refers to one-way preferential trade agreements and Type 2 refers to
two-way preferential trade agreements.
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belong to the same free trade agreement in year t. Following Baier, Bergstrand, and
Feng (2014), I combine custom union, common border, and economic union into one
dummy CUCijt, denoting the status of “deeper EIA.” Additionally, I generate four
interaction terms for each sub-category as below:
lnTRADEijt = β0 + β1 (FTAijt) + β2 (CUCijt) + β3 (POLijt) + β4 (RESijt)
+ β5 (FTPOLijt) + β6 (FTRESijt) + β7 (CUPOLijt)
+ β8 (CURESijt) + δit + ψjt + υijt
(10)
where FTPOLijt is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j share both
a FTA and an MEA in pollution type and zero otherwise, FTRESijt is a binary
variable which is unity if country i and j have a FTA and a natural-resource type
of MEA and zero otherwise. Similarly, CUPOLijt (CURESijt) is indicating whether
country i and j belong to the same “deep” EIA and pollution (resource)-type MEA in
year t. And I also use FD approach to check the effects of changes in each agreement
type and their interaction terms on trade flows:





































































2.2.4 Estimating the size impact of MEAs
Besedeš, Johnson, and Tian (2016) in their work address a series of economic factors
that lead to MEAs being formed. They find that a country pair is more likely to
sign an MEA or have more of them if they are economically larger and of similar
economic size, closer in distance, have a preferential trade agreement, and trade
more. Additionally, they find results are strongest for MEAs between a small number
of countries, indicating that MEAs are formed to manage common pool resources.
On the basis of their finding, I divide MEAs into different-size groups and try to look
into the size difference. To have a comparison between the baseline results based on
all the MEAs, I additionally examine the sub-groups of: (i) MEAs with fewer than
the sample median number of signatories (26); and (ii) MEAs with greater than the
3rd quartile number of signatories (68). In my combined dataset, number of MEA
signatories among all trading countries are from 3 to 197.
Small and large environmental agreements have different economic determinants,
as the former would be more closely brought up by member countries’ cooperation in
the use of common pool resources (Besedeš, Johnson, and Tian, 2016). As a result
it is possible that they may have different effects on international trade as well. Pre-
vious studies such as Barrett (1994) and Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg (2003)
also provide theoretical supporting evidence: self-enforcing environmental agreements
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could sustain a large number of signatories only when the difference in net benefits
between the non-cooperative and fully cooperative outcomes is very small. Specifi-
cally, the smaller the actual commitment, the larger the set of participants. Hence,
the preassumption is that environmental agreements with fewer signatories are signed
by countries which desire to deal with common pool resource issues, while larger ones
are most likely what one may call “statement” or “preference” agreements in which
countries express a desire to deal with an issue but make no strict commitments.
2.3 Data Description
The trade flow data are an aggregation of trade flows from the UN Comtrade database,
using the 5-digit SITC revision 1 data as the starting point as it provides the longest
possible time series. In this paper, I use five-year window data from 1965 to 2005 for
all potential trade partners with zero trade flows excluded. Previous studies such as
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) address the issue
of zero trade flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in their work test the effect of
zero trade flows by substituting ones for zeros, and find the estimated coefficients of
FTAs are materially the same. The reason that I use every five-year data instead
of annually data is that the policies, such as FTAs and IEAs do not change that
frequently (see Anderson and Yotov, 2011). It will provide me a clearer result of how
the environmental policies and trade agreements affect international trade. All trade
flow data are scaled by GDP deflators to generate real trade flows.
The economic integration agreements data including 198 countries are obtained
from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) who compiled the Database on Economic Integra-
tion Agreements. They classified integration agreements following Lawrence (2000)
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and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997).5 I use the most recently updated version (Septem-
ber 2015) of the database which coverd 23,201 country-pairs over 56 years and gener-
ate dummy variables for all types of free trade agreements according to their indexes.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) chose to include only full (no partial) FTAs and cus-
toms unions in their assessment of trade agreement impact. In another study Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), they define a multichotomous index of the level of EIA
between a large number of country pairs for a large number of years. Their finding
of a positive EIA impact on trade margins further confirms the earlier conclusion in
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) that FTAs significantly increase bilateral trade flows be-
tween trading members. Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) further find that “deeper
EIA” types have significantly positive stimulating effects on both the intensive and
extensive margins, and such beneficial effects even become larger when lagged effects
are considered.
The environmental agreements data are obtained from the Ronald B. Mitchell
(2002-2015) IEA Database project.6 The IEA Database includes a comprehensive
list of over 1,190 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), over 1,150 bilateral
environmental agreements (BEAs), and 250 other environmental agreements since
1857. As membership data for almost all MEAs are included and updated, my re-
search relies mostly on MEAs to grasp a better understanding of the role of IEAs on
trade growth. For each agreement, basic information provides signature date, agree-
ment titles, members, agreement type by topic covered, lineage,7 and sequences.8 To
control the change in intensity of international environmental cooperation within the
sample period 1965-2000, I use the count of all agreements between each trading pair
5The original data resource is at www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr.
6Data from Ronald B. Mitchell. 2002-2015. International Environmental Agreements Database
Project (Version 2014.3). Available at: http://iea.uoregon.edu/ Date accessed: June 2015
7A lineage is any set of legally-related agreements that are linked by the fact that they modify,
replace, extend or otherwise constitute agreements that have a legal relationship to each other.
8The sequence reflects the legal sequence of agreements capturing any amendments and protocols
pertaining to an agreement.
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by year. As some agreements are updated and amended over time, I adjust all my
counts of the IEA members by their lineages to avoid any potential duplication.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Full FTAs and MEA variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Value of imports (Thousands of USD) 94808 1.34e+08 1.39e+09 1 1.73e+11
Full FTAs (eia ≥ 3) 81730 .072 .258 0 1
MEA (pol. and res. type) 94808 .821 .383 0 1
Both FTA and MEA (FTA×MEA) 94808 .06 .237 0 1
MEA with less than 26 signatories 94808 .214 .41 0 1
MEA with more than 68 signatories 94808 .816 .388 0 1
Table 1 summarizes my multilateral environmental agreements data collected from
the IEA database. As I focus on the multilateral agreements only and use them to
represent all IEAs in my estimation, MEA and IEA designations are used interchange-
ably. Among them, the variable “Value of Imports” represents the bilateral real trade
flows between each country pair in a specific year, summing over all sectors. I drop
zero trade flows, following the rationale in Baier and Bergstrand (2007). “Full FTAs”
is a binary variable when there exists at least one no-partial preferential trade agree-
ment (EIA type equal or greater than 3) between a trading country pair. And “Both
FTA and MEA” is the interaction term denoting the existence of both a FTA and
MEA between two countries. By taking into account the number of signatories for
each environmental agreement, I also count the MEA size and divide them into the
small size group (MEAs with less than 26 signatories) and large size group (MEAs
with more than 68 signatories). Additionally, since the MEA dataset covers almost all
environmental agreements in the sample period, I recode those missing observations
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as zero MEAs in the combined data.
After taking a first step to analyze the overall impact of the presence of MEAs by
generating a binary variable “MEA” to indicate whether a particular country pair
has signed some environmental agreements during that year, I then separate MEAs
according to the categories listed in the IEA database: (i) pollution type, and (ii)
resource type. Due to concerns that some early studies may have failed to properly
detect the effect of environmental regulations, because of biases introduced into the
estimation by aggregation, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity of environmen-
tal standards, recent studies (e.g., Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Copeland and Taylor,
2009) have argued for the need to clarify the differing impact of environmental reg-
ulations across categories. This data set allows me to alleviate the aggregation bias
to some extent because of the precise disaggregated categories of IEAs. Under such
circumstance I am able to control for unobserved heterogeneity caused by category-
specific effects.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Trade and MEA Agreements by type(1965-2005)
Dummy Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Common Union 94808 .026 .159
Free Trade Agreement 94808 .036 .185
Pollution-type MEA 94808 .606 .489
Pollution-type MEA with less than 26 signatories 94808 .173 .378
Pollution-type MEA with more than 68 signatories 94808 .604 .489
Resource-type MEA 94808 .82 .384
Resource-type MEA with less than 26 signatories 94808 .213 .409
Resource-type MEA with more than 68 signatories 94808 .816 .388
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Table 2 provides a list of categorical dummies used in the FE specification and
FD sensitivity analysis to test the impact of the existence of an MEA. As discussed
in the previous section, The dummy variable of “Common Union” (CUC) is a binary
variable when EIA type is equal to or greater than 3 in a specific year t and 0
otherwise. Specifically, it is a combined variable for three types of EIAs (customs
unions, common markets and economic unions), because of the relative small number
of observations in these three types. For the small-size (number of signatories small
than 26) and large-size (number of signatories greater than 68), I also separate them
into different agreement types to have a more detailed investigation.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 FE and FD Results without Specific Agreement Types
Table 3 presents the main empirical results from Equations (4) to (7). Columns 1 to
4 present a first set of estimates using EIA, MEA, and their interaction terms. Fol-
lowing the theoretically-motivated gravity equation in Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
to take into account the “phased-in” effect of both trade and environmental agree-
ments, I allow 5-year lagged terms in columns 5 to 8, and 10-year lags in columns 9
to 12. I find that with no lagged term added, the ATE of an EIA is an increase in its
member countries’ bilateral trade flow by 25.23% (e0.225 − 1 ≈ 0.2523). Taking both
agreements and their interaction terms into account leads to an even larger ATE at
26.49% (e−0.391+0.626 − 1 ≈ 0.2649). Although the specific coefficient on concurrent
MEA is statistically insignificant, the combined impact is larger in magnitude and in-
dicating that multilateral environmental and trade agreements work as a stimulative
factor of trade growth. The positive coefficient on interaction terms indicates that
when countries have already signed bilateral trade agreements, there is a strong pos-
itive relationship between their environmental cooperation and trade growth. Such a
finding is consistent with the empirical evidence found in Besedeš, Johnson, and Tian
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(2016). After lagged terms are added starting from Column 5, the cumulative impact
of negotiating an EIA and MEA together is an increase of trade flows by 76.83%
(e0.363+0.207 − 1 ≈ 0.7683) within 5-10 year time frame. Additionally, the estimated
coefficients on MEA and its lagged terms are statistically significant and indicating a
positive impact on trade flows of 44.05% (e0.365 − 1 ≈ 0.4405) after 10 years.
As the robustness check of the FE results in Table 3, Table 4 reports the estimation
results from Equation (8) using first-differenced data. Columns 1 to 4 present the
results without lagged effects; For a country pair having both an EIA and MEA
change, the concurrent ATE on trade flow is an increase of 13.31% (e0.125−1 ≈ 0.1331).
Allowing a 10-year lagged changes on both trade and environmental agreements, I
find the cumulative ATE of MEAs are significantly negative at 26.43% (e−0.307− 1 ≈
0.2643), but the combined impact of both trade and environmental agreements is at an
increase of 26.33% (e0.135+0.0987−1 ≈ 0.2633). Therefore I find comparable estimation
results from the FE and FD approach in addressing the overall MEA impact: When
all MEAs are tested as a group, I see a small and negative impact of environmental
agreements on trade flows. However when taking into account the positive impact of
trade agreements, the deterring MEA impact is dominated by the latter. Specifically,
countries signing an EIA and MEA together seem to have an even larger increase on
trade growth than their counterpart, from which I can infer that countries have more
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 FE and FD Results with Specific Agreement Types
After taking the first step to estimate the general MEA effect, I then turn to look at
the differing MEA effect in each sub-category. With the rationale explained in the
previous section, I divide all MEAs into two types to see if there are any significant
differences across the differing types of agreements. To have a more detailed inves-
tigation of EIA impact simultaneously, I follow Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014)
to separate trade agreements into two sub-groups. Table 5 presents the results from
Equations (9) to (10). Columns 1 to 4 report the estimated coefficients on each type
of agreements when no lagged terms are being considered. From which I can see
that both type of trade agreements have a positive effect on trade flows, and those
“deeper” trade agreements CUC have an even larger impact in magnitude. With
no lagged effect, The ATE estimation of having both type of trade agreements is an
increase by 74.02% (e0.176+0.378 − 1 ≈ 0.7402) and there seems to be no significant
impact from MEAs. After allowing 5-year lagged changes, I find the resource-type of
MEAs have a statistically significant positive impact on trade flows. The cumulative
ATE of resource-type MEA is an increase of 18.41% (e0.383−0.214−1 ≈ 0.1841) on bilat-
eral trade flows. Additionally, when allowing both 5-year and 10-year lagged changes
in the last 4 columns, I find the resource type of MEAs consistently show positive
cumulative ATEs, with a further increase at 53.42% (e0.428 − 1 ≈ 0.5342), and the
pollution-type MEAs show a small and positive impact at 10.13% (e0.0965−1 ≈ 0.1013)
after 10 years. My finding of the lagged IEA effect is consistent with the empirical
evidence found in Rose and Spiegel (2009).
Table 6 presents my estimation results from Equations (11) to (12) when I use the
differenced data to investigate the categorical impact of both trade and environmental
agreements. The estimated ATE of both EIA type is comparable to the results in
Table 5 when using fixed effects approach: “deeper” trade agreements yield larger
stimulative impact on trade growth, and allowing lagged changes I find the positive
26
effects from both EIA type increase with time. I see no significant impact immediately
from either type of MEAs in the short run. However when I relax the timing by adding
5-year and 10-year lagged terms in the last four columns, I find that the pollution-type
MEAs report positive impact on trade growth. Specifically, increasing a pollution-
type MEA would increase the country members’ bilateral trade volume by 9.78%




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To check whether the number of signatories would influence the estimated impact of
environmental agreements, I re-estimate all the fixed effects specifications by mea-
suring the size of environmental agreements. I divide all MEAs into two sub-groups
according to their number of signatories. MEAs of small size represent those agree-
ments with less than 26 (the sample median) member countries, and MEAs of large
size are the agreements with more than 68 (the 3rd quartile) member countries. With
the results shown in Tables 7 to 10, I find the categorical EIA and MEA effects are
consistent with the FE estimation results in Table 3 and Table 5 when MEAs of all
sizes are included.
2.5.1 FE Estimation of Small-size MEAs
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients when I focus on the sub-group of MEAs
with less than 26 signatories. “MEA26” indicates a binary variable when there exists
at least one MEA with less than 26 signatories between a trading country pair. I find
a consistently positive impact from small size MEAs on trade flows within 5-10 year
time frame. Additionally, the estimated MEA impact becomes even larger when
lagged effect is taken into account.
Table 8 presents the estimated categorical impact within the sub-group of small
size MEAs. The interesting finding here is that in the sub-group of small-size MEAs,
both the pollution and resource type show a significantly positive impact on trade
flows more immediately as compared to the lagged categorical impacts when using all
sizes of MEAs. Specifically, when a country pair has both a free trade agreement and
a pollution-type MEA, the combined effect would be an immediate increase in the
country members’ bilateral trade volume of 30.47% (e0.152+0.114− 1 ≈ 0.3047). While
if countries have both a free trade agreement and a resource-type MEA signed at the
same year, there would be a 5-year lagged increase on their trade flows of 33.24%
35
(e0.150+0.137−1 ≈ 0.3324). Intuitively, small-size MEAs are more likely to be bilateral
or regional agreements, on a basis to address some particular environmental issues.
2.5.2 FE Estimation of Large-size MEAs
The estimation results of large-size MEAs influence are reported in Table 9. “MEA68”
indicates a binary variable when there exists at least one MEA with more than
68 signatories between a trading country pair. According to column 2, the pres-
ence of large size MEA is reducing a country pair’s bilateral trade flow by 17.3%
(e−0.190 − 1 ≈ −0.173). The results here indicate that small size MEAs and large
size ones actually have differential impacts on trade flows, which confirms previous
findings in Besedeš, Johnson, and Tian (2016) that large size MEAs are more likely to
be “presence” or “statement” agreements, and actually has no strict commitments.
I find the categorical impacts of large size MEAs are actually insignificant from
Table 10. For the pollution type, the estimated coefficient is close to Table 5 when
using all MEAs in different sizes: the existence of a pollution-type MEA would be
increasing countries’ bilateral trade flow by 10.35% (e0.0985 − 1 ≈ 0.1035) after 10
years, which confirms the previous results when using all-size MEAs. The impact of
resource-type MEA is insignificant, although I find the interaction term of resource
agreement and FTA has a positive coefficient, indicating a positive relationship be-
tween resource-type MEA and trade growth. The results here confirm the assump-
tion that large-size MEAs are less influential than their counterparts in small-size,
because of their difficulty in implementation. The finding of such a differential im-
pact of MEAs in different sizes is consistent with the previous conclusion by Williams
(2008), in which he addresses four critical factors to the success of most international
environmental initiative: public participation, enforcement and monitoring, conflict
management, and institutional arrangements – the absence of which can impede ef-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6 Discussion of Individual Effects of MEAs
Several explanations of the lack of an effect of environmental agreements are as fol-
lows. There are two important aspects of how environmental agreements are different
from trade agreements. First of all, two countries usually have one trade agreement,
which tends to be comprehensive (covering all products) or almost comprehensive.
Environmental agreements tend to be far more specific dealing with a particular issue
and thus not affecting all products. This allows countries to sign multiple environ-
mental agreements. Moreover, it is possible that if one uses data disaggregated at
the industry or product level, along with environmental agreements coded for which
industries they affect, it could be that those industries affected by a new environ-
mental regulation will be negatively affected. Thus, there are two aggregation issues.
One is that I am using bilateral aggregated trade data, while the other is that I am
using a single environmental agreement dummy, when in fact I preferably should be
using multiple ones. To address the shortcomings of such a general approach, in this
section I estimate an individual effect specific to each environmental agreement.
The estimation approach of an agreement-specific effect is motivated by Kohl
(2014). While most studies on trade agreements are focusing on the investigation of
an overall effect on trade flows common to all agreements, Kohl (2014) provides not
only estimated effects of trade agreements at an aggregate level, but also agreement-
specific average treatment effects. Using the same FD estimation method as in Baier
and Bergstrand (2007), he states that traditional estimates of an aggregated EIA
impact seem exaggerated: the individual effect on trade are often zero when endo-
geneity has been accounted for and only a few agreements increase trade. Such a
finding is consistent with Rose et al. (2004), which cast doubt on the assumption
that General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) actually increased trade. In a subsequent study, Kohl,
Brakman, and Garretsen (2016) focus on addressing the heterogeneity in the design
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of 296 trade agreements and find that for different trade agreements, the contents
and scope may to a large extent deviate from each other.
There are 773 environmental agreements in the dataset, with 383 of them having
less than or equal to 26 signatories (denoted as small-size MEAs) and 203 having
more than or equal to 68 signatories (denoted as large-size MEAs). All statistics of
signatories are counted until the year 2013. By creating a dummy variable for each
individual environmental agreement in the dataset, I re-run the FD estimation in (i)
all-size MEAs, (ii) small-size MEAs, and (iii) large-size MEAs as below:


































where the subscript ranging from 1 to k denotes each MEA in the dataset.
Generally, the results show that only a small portion of the MEAs have significant
impact on trade flows. Specifically, when all-size 773 MEAs are included in the esti-
mation, I find 77 (9.97%) agreements have had a significant impact on trade flows, the
number of which being trade-promoting is 40 (5.17%), even slightly larger than the
number with a trade-deterring ones at 37 (4.79%). In the sub-group of 383 small-size
MEAs, I find 41 (10.7%) agreements are showing significant impact on trade volume.
Again, I find the number of MEAs showing a positive effect is 24 (6.27%), outweigh-
ing the number with a negative impact at 17 (4.44%). Such a positive MEA impact
could be explained in two ways. First, when a pair of countries has an environmental
agreement signed, the initial impact could be that they have more incentive to co-
operate with each other on trade. Barret (1994) provides a model showing that IEA
might lead to a higher degree of cooperation between signatories, when the difference
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between cooperative and non-cooperative outcome is small. Second, for some partic-
ular industries, a higher level of environmental standards brought up by IEAs could
serve as a stimulative factor on increasing varieties of products, more inventions of
equipment and machinery, and advanced technology in production in order to com-
ply with new regulations, hence indirectly leading to a higher trade volume between
trading country pairs.
Table 11 presents the detailed results of checking the specific impact of each MEA
when the number of signatories is low. The results show that some of the environ-
mental agreements have large and statistically significant positive impact on trade.
The effect of most MEAs is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Comparing to
the percentage I find in all-size group, small-size MEAs have a larger effect on trade,
and such a finding is consistent with the conclusion when evaluating the aggregate
MEA impact in the previous section. Furthermore, this confirms previous findings
in Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen (2016) that overlooking the issue of agreements
heterogeneity may be problematic. Because of limited space I am not reporting the
agreement-specific results for the full sample and for large MEAs. In the large-size
sub-group of 203 MEAs, the number of agreements showing a significant impact is
lower than that in the small-size and all-size group: only 9 (4.43%) agreements are
found to have significant effects, of which 6 (2.96%) have a positive effect and the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Due to limited data availability on international environmental agreements and poli-
cies, existing studies addressing the effect of MEAs are quite rare. This work attempts
to answer the question of whether MEAs have a negative effect on international trade
as is often thought. Same as evaluating the effects of free trade agreements, estimating
the effects of environmental agreements using traditional gravity equation approach
suffers from the potential bias caused by the endogeneity. Using fixed effects panel
gravity equations and 1965-2005 panel data, the results show that on average envi-
ronmental agreements have no effect on trade. I further study categorical impacts of
both free trade agreements and environmental agreements, as well as their interac-
tion terms. My findings are consistent with the baseline results that environmental
agreements have no effect on trade.
Additionally, I separate all MEAs into groups of different sizes, and find differential
impacts between MEAs of small and large size. Countries are potentially more likely
to have environmental agreements when they expect smaller effects on international
trade, or comparative advantage. As a further robustness check I also address the
specific impact of every environmental agreement. I find that a large portion of MEAs
have insignificant impact on trade flows. Only a small percentage of MEAs present
a statistically significant stimulating or deterring impact on trade. Such a finding to
some extent explains why the estimation of an aggregate impact of a large number
of MEAs has mixed results: some MEAs have significant impact on trade flows while
others not. When I evaluate the general impact by including all of them together,
the significance in some individual estimation results might be absorbed by a large
number of insignificance from the rest of the sample.
For future research, I wish to go broadly further in the following aspects. First,
this paper places more emphasis on investigating the aggregate effect of MEAs by con-
sidering the presence of environmental agreements rather than the number of MEAs
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between each country pair. It is possible that using the number of MEAs as indicators
in the generalist approach could generate more detailed results of the overall MEA
impact. Also, different MEAs have diversified characteristics such as the types, sub-
jects, coverage, signature date, lineages, and number of signatories. All of which may
have a differential impact on international trade. Conducting more detailed investi-
gations on these heterogenous design of MEAs as well as their statuses of regulation
implementation could provide more insights on the specialist approach. Additionally,
the difference between the announcement and ratification date of every environmental
agreement may bias the results. The upgrade or amendment of existing agreements
may or may not affect firms’ behavior, hence the influences on international trade are
quite unclear. There is also one more approach to be fulfilled. The environmental
agreement dummies could be further separated to indicate whether the agreement in
question is the first, second, third, and so on agreement between the two countries,
so as to enable future work to have a more detailed investigation of the differential
timing impact for each IEA.
When it comes to the evaluation of trade impact, using a single dummy variable
standing for environmental agreements provides me with a limited capacity to ex-
amine their effects in detail. For instance, MEAs dealing with pollution of air and
oceans may have a larger effect on bilateral trade in energy-intensive sectors, while
agreements on species and habitats will have relatively smaller effects on international
competitiveness. Using highly aggregated data on either trade volume or numbers
of environmental agreements provides me with limited results. I could either recode
the data to associate industries with agreements, or use data disaggregated to the
SITC 4-digit data level, which would address the data aggregation issue and lead
to some new findings. Furthermore, I take into account only the volume of trade
but ignore the bilateral extensive and intensive margins which the following chapter
estimates. It is reasonable to infer that MEAs have differential impacts on growth in
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trade varieties and trade volumes. This topic has political significance in evaluating
social welfare rather than the volume of trade. Finally, existing studies are starting to
place emphasis on how global trade policies are affecting the environment; therefore
another direction to investigate with the current datasets is to study how the trade
flows and EIAs change the numbers of environmental agreements. All these above
are challenging but worthwhile extensions for the subsequent work.
All in all, this paper not only provides a result of the average treatment effect
of environmental agreements on trade isolating the effects of EIAs and adjusting
for possible endogeneity, but also addresses an individual impact specific to every
environmental agreement in the current dataset. My work serves as a starting point
for a new research agenda.
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CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS ON THE EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE
MARGINS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
3.1 Introduction
This paper centers on the specific impact of international environmental agreements
(IEAs) on bilateral extensive and intensive margins of international trade flows. Ex-
isting studies in trade literature have provided insights regarding ways to define the
extensive margin.1 This study follows the trade-margin-decomposition approach by
Hummels and Klenow (2005) to define the extensive margin of bilateral exports as
a weighted count of exporter’s varieties exported to the importer, and the intensive
margin as the exporter’s relative volume of exports. A large number of empirical
studies have addressed the impact of trade-liberalizing policies on trade growth (see
Trefler, 2004; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Magee, 2003; Goldberg et al., 2009). A
recent paper Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) builds on the analysis of Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and investigates the impact of the formation of an economic inte-
gration agreement (EIA) on trade margins. They find not only evidence of differential
impacts of EIAs by type, but also a novel “timing” difference between the intensive-
and extensive-margin effects, with the former occurring sooner than the latter but
finally being outweighed in magnitude.
1In particular, different levels of disaggregation were used when defining the extensive margin.
See, for example, Hillberry and McDaniel (2002) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) decompose trade
growth at the product-sector level, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) conduct their data at the
level of individual producers, and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) provide estimates of the
extensive margin at the country level.
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My investigation is motivated by Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and follows
their panel estimation framework. While most free trade agreements reduce bilateral
trade barriers and to a lesser or greater extent lower trade costs for multinational
enterprises, environmental agreements are considered to work in the very opposite
direction. Despite several theoretical results supporting the notion of a deterring ef-
fect of environmental regulations on trade (e.g., Taylor, 2004; Copeland and Taylor,
2004), empirical evidence of the negative impact of environmental stringency is quite
limited (e.g., Becker and Henderson, 2000; Xing and Kolstad, 2002; Keller and Levin-
son, 2002). Others suggest no supporting evidence of a deterring effect of pollution
regulation on foreign direct investment inflows, for example.2 Due to data constraint,
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) study one particular IEA3 to identify the effects on
waste shipments among countries, and find almost no evidence that the treaty has
actually resulted in less waste being shipped.
Aiming to reconcile such mixed results in previous literature, this paper takes
a first step to estimate the general impact of IEAs on trade margins using panel
data methods. To begin with, I follow Hummels and Klenow (2005) to construct
bilateral trade margins from each country pair’s yearly trade flows. To avoid potential
estimation bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, I then apply a five-year first-
differencing approach following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The first set of our first-
differencing (FD) panel estimation results, including all IEAs without distinction of
types, indicates a negative impact of IEA membership on the intensive margin. After
adding lagged IEA terms to allow for time effects, I find the initial negative IEA
impact on the intensive margin eventually becomes smaller within a 10–15 year time
frame. I find no effects on the extensive margin. To provide a detailed investigation
2See Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), List (1999), Javorcik and Wei (2004), and
Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009).
3The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal
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of the differential effects of each type of environmental agreements, I divide IEAs
into three categories: resource, pollution, and others. To see whether the number of
IEAs two countries share has any influence, I count the total number of IEAs between
each country pair by year, and the numbers of IEAs belonging to each distinct type
as well. My results are consistent irrespective of how I look at the data. While
environmental agreements and the regulations and standards they introduce have a
detrimental effect on trade in some cases, that effect is small in magnitude.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, this paper is the first one to
my knowledge that has been looking into the impact of environmental agreements
on the margins of trade. Few papers to date have successfully investigated the effect
of environmental agreements on trade margins due to limited data availability on
existing environmental agreements. The unique IEA data enable me to take a large
number of IEAs into account and test the general relationship between the variety
and volume of trading goods and environmental regulations.
Second, looking into various IEA types, I provide the first evidence of the differ-
ential impact of IEAs by category. Specifically, I find that both the pollution and
resource type of IEAs have a negative effect on the intensive margin as well as overall
trade. My finding that the intensive margin is more sensitive to changes in trade
barriers than corresponding extensive margin is consistent with the predictions of a
few theoretical models. One supporting example is the national differentiation model
of Armington (1969), in which it assumes that each country produces a single variety
in each category so there is no extensive margin. And a modified version predicts
that competitive trade in goods is differentiated by country of origin. Another match-
ing model is the simple quality differentiation model (see Flam and Helpman, 1987;
Grossman and Helpman, 1993). In which there’s no extensive margin, and richer
economies, by exporting higher-quality goods, can export higher quantities without
lowering their prices. In addition to these theoretical perspectives, my finding is also
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consistent with the Melitz-type model in Chaney (2008), which suggests that a higher
elasticity of substitution magnifies the sensitivity of the intensive margin to changes
in trade barriers, whereas it dampens the sensitivity of the extensive margin. In
parallel, a large strand of empirical literature on the role of intensive versus exten-
sive margins has also reached a consensus of the primacy of the intensive margin, as
the latter is considered largely dependent on new export relationships and therefore
more frail and less sensitive than the former to changes in trade costs, especially in a
short-run analysis (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein,
2008; Eaton et al., 2008; Besedeš and Prusa, 2011).
Third, this paper confirms the mutual supportiveness between IEAs and trade
growth, by taking into account the effect of trade agreements. When countries agree
on environmental agreements alongside with trade agreements, the negative effect of
IEAs are either insignificant or marginally negative, and dominated by the stimulat-
ing effect of trade agreements. Specifically, even though the environmental stringency
caused by regulatory agreements increase pollution abatement cost or restrict the ex-
ploitation of a natural resource, reducing the trading volume (intensive margin), the
positive effects of trade agreements outweigh such negative effects either by simply en-
abling an increase in the traded volume through lower trade costs or by environmental
regulation potentially stimulating innovation and green technology, hence increasing
the value-weighted variety of trading goods (extensive margin). Additionally, the in-
creased environmental stringency in those pollution-intensive sectors would act as a
second trade barrier for foreign polluting enterprises to enter the local market, and
the local firms with less competition pressure could increase their production and
export volume eventually.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a de-
tailed description of the empirical methodology to assess the impact of environmental
agreements, following the margins decomposition method by Hummels and Klenow
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(2005) and the panel estimation approach from Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Section
3.3 discusses the three data sources and related work. Section 3.4 explains the em-
pirical findings of a deterring impact of IEAs on trade margins, from which I confirm
a deterring impact of IEAs on trade margins. Section 3.5 provides several robustness
checks by switching between different estimation models and sample periods, followed
by concluding remarks in Section 3.6.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 The Hummels-Klenow Margin-Decomposition Methodology
Feenstra (1994) applies a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregator func-
tion that identifies the gains from variety by keeping track of only two factors: the
elasticity of substitution among different categories of goods, and shifts in expendi-
ture shares among new and disappearing product varieties. His work demonstrates
that increasing the number of varieties does not increase productivity much if new va-
rieties are close substitutes to existing varieties or if the share of new varieties is small
relative to existing ones. With such micro-foundations developed for measuring the
impact of new varieties on productivity, Hummels and Klenow (2005) investigate the
extent to which a country with a higher volume of exports does so because it exports
a wider variety of goods (extensive margin) or because it exports larger quantities of
each variety (intensive margin).
Starting with the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation of consumers’ utility maximization
and assuming that Xijt denotes the value of country i’s exports to country j in year












where XmWjt denotes the trade value of country j’s imports from the world in a par-
ticular product m in year t, MWjt is the set of all categories of products exported
by the world to j in year t, and Mijt is the subset of all products exported from i
to j in year t. Therefore, EMijt is a measure of the fraction of all products that are
exported from i to j in year t , where each product is weighted by the importance of
its category in world exports to j in year t.
The corresponding intensive margin, comparing nominal shipments from i to j in










where Xmijt denotes the value of exports from i to j in category m in year t. Therefore,
IMijt represents the market share of country i in country j’s imports from the world
within the set of products that i exports to j in year t. Note that the numerator of
Equation(14) is equal to the denominator of Equation(15). Hence, one of the notable
properties of their trade-margin-decomposition methodology is that the product of










where Xjt denotes j ’s imports from the world. Taking the natural logarithms of
Equation(16) along with some algebra yields:
lnEMijt + ln IMijt = ln
Xijt
Xjt
= lnOV ERijt (17)
from which they decompose overall exports from exporter i to importer j in any year
t linearly into extensive margin and intensive margin. The overall margin between a
bilateral country pair is defined as the proportion of j’s imports from country i to j’s
imports from the world.
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Several empirical studies have followed the Hummels and Klenow (2005) decom-
position methodology to investigate the effects of trade liberalizations on the intensive
and extensive margins of trade. Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) find significant evidence of
growth in the extensive margin following a decrease in trade barriers. Hillberry and
McDaniel (2002) also use the Hummels and Klenow (2005) approach to offer some
basic insights into the nature of U.S. trade growth since NAFTA. They conclude that
the United States is trading more of the same goods with NAFTA partners since
1993, and increasing the variety of products imported from Mexico, implying that
a new set of industries has had to face competition from Mexican varieties. Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) are the first among them to find economically and sta-
tistically significant effects of economic integration agreements (EIAs) on both the
intensive and extensive (goods) margins in the context of a large number of country
pairs, EIAs, and years.
3.2.2 Estimating the impact of international environmental agreements
To empirically estimate the precise effects of international environmental agreements
on trade using panel data of trade flows constructed from a 1965 to 2000 sample
period and international environmental agreements, following Baier, Bergstrand, and
Feng (2014) I use a set of five-year first differenced equations as below.
∆5 lnOV ERijt = β0 + β1 (∆5IEAijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt (18)
∆5 lnEMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5IEAijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt (19)
∆5 ln IMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5IEAijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt (20)
where ∆5 refers to first-differencing over 5 years. Note that the bilateral country-pair
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fixed effects are eliminated by taking the first difference. However, the exporter-
time δ5,it and importer-time ψ5,jt fixed effects are retained to capture changes in
the time-varying exporter and importer GDP and multilateral price terms over the
same five-year period. Otherwise, ignoring such effects would cause potential omitted
variable bias (see Foster, Poeschl, and Stehrer, 2011).
As discussed in Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), the first-difference (FD) ap-
proach yields some potential advantages over fixed effects (FE), especially when the
unobserved heterogeneity are highly serially correlated. Under such circumstances,
the inefficiency of FE is exacerbated as T increases. Additionally, as Wooldridge
(2010) notes, if the data follow unit-root processes (e.g., aggregate trade flow) and
T is large, the spurious regression problem can arise in a panel using FE methods.
Therefore, with a large-T panel (T=8 after five-year differencing in the sample), the
FD approach would be increasing estimation efficiency than using the FE method.
To avoid potential over-rejection problems, I use clustered standard errors at country-
pair levels in each set of FD estimation.
After testing the general effect of all environmental agreements, I then separate
all IEAs into three types (pollution, resource, and others) to examine whether there’s
a significant difference between each sub-category of IEAs. The “Pollution” category
aims to capture all agreements related to all forms of pollution, whether affecting air,
land, oceans, or freshwater systems at regional or global scales. While the “Resource”
category includes most non-pollution related subjects: Species, Nature, Habitat and
oceans, and Freshwater resources. As the last IEA category defined in this work,
“Other” refers to the rest of non-pollution related agreements, including “Energy”
and “Weapons and Environment.” These agreements seek to capture agreements that
address energy production, including nuclear energy, as well as weapons that affect
the environments such as the nuclear bomb as well as bacteriological, chemical, and
toxin weapons. The estimating equations for each IEA type on trade margins are:
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∆5 lnOV ERijt = β0 + β1 (∆5POLijt) + β2 (∆5RESijt) + β3 (∆5OTHijt)
+ δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(21)
∆5 lnEMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5POLijt) + β2 (∆5RESijt) + β3 (∆5OTHijt)
+ δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(22)
∆5 ln IMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5POLijt) + β2 (∆5RESijt) + β3 (∆5OTHijt)
+ δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(23)
where POLijt is a binary variable equal to unity if country i and j belong to one or
more IEAs in pollution type and zero otherwise, RESijt is a binary variable equal to
unity if country i and j share the natural resource type of IEA and zero otherwise,
and OTHijt is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j share the other type
of IEA and zero otherwise.
According to existing studies on trade liberalization (see Esty, 2001), commitment
to free trade may create incentives to distort environmental policy. The empirical find-
ings in Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) are indicating the significantly stimulative
impact of trade integration on the bilateral intensive and extensive margins of each
trading country-pair as well. Hence one might be wondering whether ignoring the
effect of trade agreements would potentially bias the findings of negative IEA impact
on trade margins. Given this concern, I add controls of trade agreements into the
regressions to check whether and how the estimated impact of IEA will be influenced
by taking them into account. The series of regression equations after adding all trade
agreements broadly defined as economic integration agreement (EIA) variables are as
below:
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∆5 lnOV ERijt = β0 + β1 (∆5NRPijt) + β2 (∆5PTAijt) + β3 (∆5FTAijt)
+ β4 (∆5COMijt) + β5 (∆5POLijt) + β6 (∆5RESijt)
+ β7 (∆5OTHijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(24)
∆5 lnEMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5NRPijt) + β2 (∆5PTAijt) + β3 (∆5FTAijt)
+ β4 (∆5COMijt) + β5 (∆5POLijt) + β6 (∆5RESijt)
+ β7 (∆5OTHijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(25)
∆5 ln IMijt = β0 + β1 (∆5NRPijt) + β2 (∆5PTAijt) + β3 (∆5FTAijt)
+ β4 (∆5COMijt) + β5 (∆5POLijt) + β6 (∆5RESijt)
+ β7 (∆5OTHijt) + δ5,it + ψ5,jt + υ5,ijt
(26)
where NRPijt is a binary variable equal to unity if countries i and j belong to the
same non-preferential (or one-way preferential) trade agreement and zero otherwise,
PTAijt denotes another binary variable being unity if i and j belong to the same
two-way preferential trade agreement, and FTAijt is a binary variable indicating
whether country i and j belong to the same free trade agreement in year t. Following
Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) I combine custom unions, common markets, and
economic unions into one dummy COMijt, denoting the status of “deeper EIA,” so as
to distinguish them from those “partial FTA” (NRPijt and PTAijt) and “full FTA”
(FTAijt).
Besides utilizing a set of binary variables to represent the control of IEA member-
ship, I also examine another set of variables by taking the logarithms of the number
of international environmental agreements that each country pair is a member of on
an annual basis. To avoid a potential missing-variable trap when a pair of coun-





One advantage of the analysis using IEA numbers to replace IEA dummy variable
is that it predicts how the change in the growth rate of the number of IEAs affects
the growth rate of bilateral extensive and intensive margins. In addition, relying only
on the dummy specification identifying when a pair of countries shares at least one
IEA creates problems in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when most countries become
members of at least one IEA significantly reducing the variation of interest. No such
concern exists if the object of interest is the number of agreements a pair of countries
shares. Hence, I take a second step to capture the IEA effect by counting the number
of IEAs per year between country i and j.
3.3 Data Description
The trade flow data used to calculate the bilateral extensive and intensive goods
margins are from the NBER-United Nations 1962-2000 world trade data constructed
by Robert Feenstra and Robert Lipsey.4 Their NBER-UN data are constructed over
two periods: (i) the early years (1962-1983) are taken from UN data collected and
originally organized by 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification, Revision
1 (SITC Rev. 1) and (ii) the later years (1984-2000) are from UN Comtrade data,
covering 72 reporter countries’ trade flows (provided that they exceeded $100,000 per
year) classified by SITC Rev. 2, and also include quantities of exports and imports.
After converting the SITC Rev. 1 codes to SITC Rev. 2 for the early years and
also adjusting the country codes similar to the United Nations classification, the final
dataset covers trade flows reported by 192 exporters and 198 importers. For each
year, trade flows reported by the importing country were primarily used, as they are
assumed to be more accurate than reports by exporters. Only when the importer
report is not available for a country-pair then the corresponding exporter report is
used instead.
4Available at www.nber.org/data and documented in Feenstra et al. (2005).
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The economic integration agreements data including 198 countries are obtained
from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) who compiled the Database on Economic Integra-
tion Agreements. They classified integration agreements following Lawrence (2000)
and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997).5 I use the most recently updated version (Septem-
ber 2015) of the database which coverd 23,201 country-pairs over 56 years and gener-
ate dummy variables for all types of free trade agreements according to their indexes.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) choose to include only FTA and customs unions in
their assessment of trade agreement impact. In their later study Baier, Bergstrand,
and Feng (2014), they define a multichotomous index of the level of EIA between a
large number of country pairs for a large number of years. Their finding of a pos-
itive EIA impact on trade margins further confirms the earlier conclusion in Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) that FTAs significantly increase bilateral trade flows between
trading members. Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) further find that “deeper EIA”
types have significantly positive stimulating effects on both the intensive and exten-
sive margins, and such beneficial effects even become larger when lagged effects are
considered.
The environmental agreements data are obtained from the Ronald B. Mitchell
(2002-2015) IEA Database project. The IEA Database includes a comprehensive list
of over 1,190 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), over 1,150 bilateral en-
vironmental agreements (BEAs), and 250 other environmental agreements since 1857.
As membership data for almost all MEAs are included and updated, my research re-
lies mostly on MEAs to grasp a better understanding of the role of IEAs on trade
5Data from Database on Economic Integration Agreements (September 2015). Available at:
www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr. Date accessed: November 2015.
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growth. For each agreement, basic information provides signature date, agreement ti-
tles, members, agreement type by topic covered, lineage,6 and sequences.7 To control
the change in intensity of international environmental cooperation within the sample
period 1965-2000, I use the count of all agreements between each trading pair by year.
As some agreements are updated and amended over time, I adjust all counts of the
IEA members by their lineages to avoid any potential duplication.
Table 12: Summary Statistics of IEAs (1951-2013) by category
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sum(IEA) 1,580,068 34.951 51.616 1 459
Pollution dummy 1,580,068 0.08 0.488 0 1
Resource dummy 1,580,068 0.976 0.152 0 1
Other dummy 1,580,068 0.542 0.498 0 1
Table 12 shows the multilateral environmental agreements data collected from the
IEA database. As I only use the multilateral environmental agreements I use the
IEA and MEA designations interchangeably. The variable “sum(IEA)” counts the
number of agreements recorded between each country pair by year. After merging the
IEA dataset together with the trade flow data and trade agreements data, I create a
dummy variable indicating whether there exist at least one environmental agreement
for each country pair. Since the IEA dataset covers almost all environmental agree-
ments in the sample period, I recode those missing observations as zero IEAs in the
combined data.
6A lineage is any set of legally-related agreements that are linked by the fact that they modify,
replace, extend or otherwise constitute agreements that have a legal relationship to each other.
7The sequence reflects the legal sequence of agreements capturing any amendments and protocols
pertaining to an agreement.
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In the empirical analysis, I first analyze the general effects of the presence of IEAs
by generating a binary variable “dIEA” to indicate whether a particular country
pair has signed some environmental agreements during that year. After estimating
the effect on all IEAs combined, I separate IEAs according to the categories listed in
the IEA database: (i) pollution, (ii) resource, and (iii) others.
Due to concerns that some early studies may have failed to properly detect the ef-
fect of environmental regulations, because of biases introduced into the estimation by
aggregation, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity of environmental standards,
recent studies (e.g., Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Copeland and Taylor, 2009) have
argued for the need to clarify the differing impact of environmental regulations across
categories. The data set allows us to alleviate the aggregation bias to some extent
because of the precise disaggregated categories of IEAs. Under such circumstance I
am able to control for unobserved heterogeneity caused by category-specific effects.
3.4 Empirical Results
Table 13 provides a list of variables used in the FD specification and sensitivity analy-
sis to test the existence of an IEA impact. Among them, value of imports refer to the
bilateral real trade flows between each country pair in a specific year, summing over
all sectors. I drop zero trade flows, following the rationale in Baier and Bergstrand
(2007). As discussed in the previous section, bilateral intensive and extensive mar-
gins are decomposed from the trade flow data using Equations 14 and 15. Overall
margin refers to the proportion of country i’s exports value to country j relative to
country j’s total exports value. Following Equation 16 and 17, it is calculated as
the product of the extensive margin and intensive margin for a specific country pair
ij. The Hummels and Klenow (2005) decomposition structure indicates that for each
bilateral country-pair, the sum of variations in the extensive and intensive margins
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Table 13: Summary Statistics of Trade Margins and Agreements(1965-2000)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Value of imports 106,775 236,144.1 1680,430 0.660 1.54e+08
Overall margins 106,775 0.016 0.048 7.85e-09 0.973
Intensive margins 106,775 0.050 0.107 1.98e-07 1
Extensive margins 106,775 0.238 0.282 2.58e-07 1
sum(IEA) 106,775 17.133 30.254 0 310
IEA dummy 106,775 0.767 0.423 0 1
EIAs 106,775 0.273 0.735 0 6
Common union (4-6) 106,775 0.010 0.102 0 1
Free trade agreement(3) 106,775 0.021 0.144 0 1
Two-way partial trade(2) 106,775 0.022 0.146 0 1
One-way partial trade(1) 106,775 0.119 0.323 0 1
would be equal to the variation in overall margins. From which the relative elasticities
of trade margins to IEAs are inferred. The dummy variable of IEA (dIEA) takes the
value of 1 when sum(IEA) is no less than one in a specific year t and 0 otherwise.
3.4.1 FD Results without and with Specific IEA Agreement Types
Table 14 presents the main empirical results from Eqs. (20) to (22). Panel 14.A
gives a first set of estimates using dIEA and their lagged terms. Within a 15-year
time frame, I find significant negative correlation between IEAs and the intensive
margin. International environmental agreements taken as a whole have no statistically
significant effect on the extensive margin, with a coefficient that is usually small and
positive. The overall margin estimates display a consistently negative effect of IEAs,
somewhat smaller than the effect on the extensive margin, which is solely due to the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first three columns show the results allowing only a five-year change of IEAs.
To see if there are any time effects, I add a 10-year lag in columns 4 to 6, and then both
10-year and 15-year lagged effects in the last three columns. I find that taking into
account both lagged and current changes in IEAs gives even larger estimated effects on
both overall and intensive margins. Specifically, IEA membership generally decreases
two trading countries’ bilateral intensive margin by 10.68% (e−0.113 − 1 ≈ −0.1068)
within a 5-10 year time period, which further increases to 21.73% (e−(0.126+0.119)−1 ≈
0.2173) after 15 years. My finding of the lagged IEA effect is consistent with the
empirical evidence found in Rose and Spiegel (2009).
In Panel 14.B when I replace the binary IEA variable with the count of the num-
ber of IEAs between each country pair, I find that the effects of five-year and 10-year
lagged change in IEA numbers are insignificant on either extensive or intensive mar-
gins. However, when I allow for a longer time effect by adding 15-year lagged changes
of IEA numbers, the growth rate of IEA numbers reduces the growth on trade mar-
gins as well. Specifically, increasing IEA numbers by one percent would decrease the
country members’ bilateral intensive margin by 7.45% ( e−(0.0374+0.0400)− 1 ≈ 0.0745)
after 15 years.
After taking the first step to estimate the general IEA effect, I then turn to look
at the differing IEA effect in each sub-category. With the rationale explained in the
previous section, I divide all IEAs into three types to see if there are any significant
differences across the three types of agreements. Table 15 presents the results. In
Panel 15.A, where I use a binary variables for each IEA type, I find evidence that
both the pollution and resource type of IEAs have to some extent a deterring effect
on the intensive and overall margins. Pollution agreements seem to have a short run
effect only, while resource agreements tend to have an effect in over the long run.
Panel 15.B presents the estimated coefficients when looking at the effects of the
changing number of IEAs in each category. The negative estimates on both intensive
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and overall margins are consistent with what I have in the upper panel when focusing
on IEA dummy variables. One interesting finding is the time effects for the resource
type. When only allowing five-year change in IEA size, the increase in IEA has no
effect on trade margins. However, when I relax the timing by adding 10-year and 15-
year lagged terms, the deterring effect of IEA growth shows up in intensive margins
first and then in overall margins as well. Specifically, increasing the resource type of
IEA by one percent would decrease the country members’ bilateral intensive margin
by 3.67% (e−0.0374−1 ≈ −0.0367) after 10 years, and lead to an even larger reduction
after 15 years at 8.92% ( e−(0.0477+0.0457) − 1 ≈ −0.892).
My finding of the negative IEA impact on intensive margin and no impact on
extensive margin is consistent with the prediction in Chaney (2008), of which the
main idea is that in the presence of firm heterogeneity, the elasticity of substitution
has opposite effects on the extensive and intensive margin. Building on the identical-
firm model in Krugman (1980), Chaney adds firm heterogeneity in productivity and
fixed cost of exporting to prove that, while a higher elasticity causes the intensive



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.2 Adding Trade Agreements
Table 16 presents the estimated coefficients when I consider both the effect of envi-
ronmental and trade agreements. The estimated effects of IEA terms are consistently
negative, although at a lower significance level and smaller magnitudes than those in
Table 15 when ignoring the effects from all trade agreements. My estimated coeffi-
cients on the different types of trade agreements are similar to the results in Baier,
Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) that “deeper” levels of EIA terms (COM) generally
have larger stimulating effects than FTA on both the intensive and extensive mar-
gins, and the latter have larger effects than those preferential EIA terms (NRP and
PTA). Specifically, in Panel 16.A I find that FTA membership generally increases
two trading countries’ bilateral intensive margin by 44.20% (e0.196+0.170− 1 ≈ 0.4420)
after 15 years. The interesting finding is about the prediction of negotiating FTA
and a particular IEA type such as pollution. The combined effect of FTA and POL
membership after 10 years would be an 35.83% (e0.200+0.170−0.0638 − 1 ≈ 0.3583)
increase in the bilateral overall margin of two trading partners, and an 22.07%
(e0.171+0.0949−0.0665 − 1 ≈ 0.2207) increase in the intensive margin as well. Com-
paring to such predictions, the combined effect of COM and POL membership after
10 years would be of the same sign but yielding an even higher magnitude, at about
an 50.86% (e0.310+0.165−0.0638 − 1 ≈ 0.5086) increase in the overall margin, and an
22.69% (e0.271−0.0665 − 1 ≈ 0.2269) increase in the intensive margin. In other words,
the negative impact from environmental agreements are quite small in magnitude
when comparing to the stimulating effect of non-partial trade agreements.
Panel 16.B presents the estimation results when I substitute the IEA dummies
with number of IEAs in each category. I find small and negative coefficients on the
overall and intensive margin for the pollution type, and there’s no significant impact
for the resource or other type. When a country pair has a free trade agreement sealed
off, increasing the pollution type of IEA by one percent would decrease the country
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members’ bilateral overall margin by 4.23% (e−0.0432 − 1 ≈ −0.0423) after 5 years.
However, when I take into account the positive impact of free trade agreements, the
combined effect on the overall margin would be an 16.04% (e0.192−0.0432− 1 ≈ 0.1604)
increase after 5 years, and yield an even larger increase at 17.29% (e0.200−0.0405 −
1 ≈ 0.1729) after 10 years. Therefore the policy implication from such prediction is
that, although environmental agreements have a deterring impact on trade margins,
that effect is relatively small and is more than offset by the positive effect of trade
agreements, if the two countries have a trade agreement.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I provide the supplementary results using 3-year first differencing and
fixed-effects approach. The main results presented in Tables 14 and 15 in section
3.4.1 use the 5-year FD specification following Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014)
approach. In a robustness analysis, I use 3-year level data following some previous
studies (see Cheng and Wall, 1999). As shown, My Set 1 FD estimation and Set 2
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5.1 Fixed Effect Results as Robustness check
One may argue that using first differenced terms of the key variables might lead
to bias estimates, because the variance of the IEAs and trade agreements might be
minor in a 10-15 year time frame. Also, out of concern that many environmental
standards, once signed might remain fixed for a longer time than trade agreements, I
re-estimate the baseline first difference specification by replacing the first differenced
terms with original variables and adding fixed effects. Table 17 presents the esti-
mation results when using FE estimation at five-year intervals of the sample period
1965-2000. The FE specifications using five-year differenced data from 1962 to 2000
yield several negative coefficients for NRP and PTA, whereas the coefficient esti-
mates for COM and FTA yield qualitatively similar coefficient estimates as using
FD specification. Such negative estimates for NRP and PTA are consistent with the
results in Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014). They explained such relationship by
the differing growth speed between intra-industry and inter-industry trade. Specif-
ically, both NRP and PTA are typical integration status between developed and
developing countries. Therefore when intra-industry growth over a particular period
dominates interindustry trade growth, this trend over time will lead to a downward





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel 17.A uses dummy variables for IEA in each category. I find no signifi-
cant deterring effects for pollution agreements. While for resource and other type,
a decrease in both overall and intensive margins occurs in a 10-15 years time frame.
Specifically, signing a resource type agreement would reduce the member countries’
bilateral intensive margin by 17.63% (e0.194− 1 ≈ 0.1763) after 15 years. Such a find-
ing is consistent with the main results when using five-year first difference estimation.
When I look at the effect of a change in IEA size in Panel 17.B, the deterring effect of
an increase in the number of resource related agreements is still significant: increas-
ing the number of resource type agreements by 1 percent would actually reduce the
member countries’ bilateral intensive margin by 6.42% (e−0.0664 − 1 ≈ −0.0642) after
10 years, and yield an even larger decrease by 9.35% (e−0.0524−0.0498 − 1 ≈ −0.0935)
after 15 years.
3.5.2 Using the Period 1965–1990
The sample period between 1965 and 2000 might lead to biased results, as by the
year 1990 most of the trading country-pairs have been involved in some level of
environmental agreement or protocols. In this section, I re-run all the first difference
estimations using a shorter time window stopping at 1990, with the results shown in
Table 18. The estimated IEA effects in the sub-sample of 1965-1990 are consistent
with the previous prediction in Table 15 when all years are included. Specifically,
for the resource type, the negative impact emerges immediately on the intensive
margin, and becomes even larger within a 15-year time frame: getting involved in
an resource type agreement would actually reduce the member countries’ bilateral
intensive margin by 31.06% (e−0.221−0.151 − 1 ≈ −0.3106) after 15 years. Moreover, a
positive impact of resource type agreements is detected here on the extensive margins,
though it is insufficiently large to offset the negative effect on the intensive margin.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































significant results for pollution and other types of agreements.
3.5.3 A Subset of Developing Countries
While there has been much work on the effects of environmental regulations on trade
competitiveness, very little work uses data from developing countries, of which many
are notorious for their severe pollution problems along with rapid economic develop-
ment in recent years. As I am interested in whether there would be a difference in the
impact of IEA between the developing countries and the rest of world, I constructed
a subset of developing countries from the whole sample. Table 19 presents a list of
the 107 developing countries specified by the World Bank in 2013. Countries with a
Gross National Income per capita of US$ 11,905 and less are defined as developing.
The re-estimated results from the subset of developing countries are shown in Table
20. The estimated effects in the developing country sub-sample does not differ much
from the main results: the resource type of IEA has a significant negative impact on
both bilateral intensive and overall margins after 10 years. For the pollution type, one
percent increase in the number of IEAs would increase the overall margins between










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Previous studies such as Feenstra et al. (1998) and Feenstra et al. (1999) show that
one main factor leading to the U.S. trade deficiency in the last two decades of the
20th century is the accelerated relocation of US imports from East Asian countries
to China. Also, Maasoumi, Racine, and Stengos (2007) use non-parametric approach
to find some divergence and convergence in the big difference China makes to the
world and international movements in GDP, trade growth, and poverty movements.
To further guard against the possibility that country selection might be affecting my
conclusions of the negative IEA impact on trade margins, I re-estimate the previous
regression with China excluded in the country list. Estimation results are presented
in Table 21. The estimated IEA categorical impact is consistent with the previous
predictions. For both the pollution-type and resource-type agreements, a negative
IEA impact appears in a 10-15 year time frame. Comparing to the previous results in
Table 15, the estimation coefficients here is quite close although marginally smaller




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5.5 3-year FD analysis
The 3-year FD results are reported in Tables 22, 23, and 24. The negative IEA impact
is not statistically significant in Table 22, when categorical difference is not taken
into account. However, in Table 23 I can see that when IEAs are separated into three
different types, the pollution-type agreements show a small and negative impact on
the bilateral intensive margins, and a positive impact on the extensive margins with or
without lagged terms being added. When trade agreements are being added in Table
24, I find the deterring impact of IEAs becomes even smaller. Such results confirm
the findings from the 5-year FD analysis: environmental agreements have little or
no impact on the extensive margins. The negotiation of trade and environmental
agreements will actually be beneficial for trading countries’ growth in trade varieties.
3.5.6 3-year FE analysis
For further investigation I also use a set of 3-year FE estimations as an alternative
approach. Tables 25, 26, and 27 report the robustness check results. I find that in
Table 25 when all type of IEAs are treated as one group, the negative IEA impact
is statistically significant on the bilateral intensive and overall margins. Using IEA
dummies and numbers of IEAs, both results are comparable and consistent. Further-
more, when I separate IEAs into sub-groups in 26 and 27, both the pollution and
resource type agreements show a significant negative impact on the intensive margins
as well. Hence I conclude that the supplementary results using a 3-year approach are































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Previous studies on the role of international environmental policies are quite rare
due to data restrictions and the endogenity problem, which exists commonly in most
assessments of the effect of environmental regulation. The paper uses panel data
estimation methods and a large number of international environmental and trade
agreements to explore whether signing environmental agreements would be reducing
a country’s growth of trade. Using five-year FD estimation methods I find that IEA
membership generally decreases two trading countries’ bilateral intensive margin by
10.68% within a 5-10 year time period, and leads to an even larger reduction at
21.73% after 15 years.
While I find the existence of a negative effect from environmental agreements, it
is more than offset by the positive effect of trade agreements should one be in place.
When two countries have both a pollution and a trade agreement in place, the com-
bined effect on the intensive margin is an increase of 27.14%. The results confirm
that environmental agreements and trade growth are reinforcing each other. Along-
side with the globalized economy and free trade development, there is a lot of concern
with environmental agreements that they are unfavorable to firms since most binding
commitments fundamentally increase costs of production. This can have a negative
effect on employment and many firm outcomes. In the sphere of international trade,
binding commitments may reduce a country’s comparative advantage and reduce its
export potential, as their firms have higher costs of production and are less able to
compete on world markets. I find that environmental agreements have little effect on
the extensive margin, so even if the costs of firms are increasing, it does not drive
them out of exporting. I do find more consistent negative effects on the intensive
margin, but they are relatively small and not always present. So while environmental
agreements do decrease the volume of trade, the effect is small. And it is always more
than offset if the two countries have a trade agreement as well.
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CHAPTER IV
POLLUTION REGULATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT INFLOWS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
4.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed one of the most contentious debates regarding interna-
tional trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the environment: the existence, the
benefits, and the drawbacks of the pollution haven effect, the result of firms’ choosing
particular areas that are not restricted by pollution-control laws because they wish
to reduce their cost of production. Although several studies document the impact of
pollution regulations on domestic production, the question of whether firms increase
FDI in response to a new domestic regulation has remained unanswered. As the cen-
tral government of China has instituted an environmental policy, referred to as the
Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy, to regulate pollution in its provinces, the country
is an ideal place to study the impact of pollution regulations on FDI.
Since it adopted the open and reform policy in 1978, the Chinese government has
been aggressively attracting FDI. Thus, since 1992, it has been the largest recipient of
FDI among developing countries, and in 2003, it surpassed the United States as the
world’s largest recipient of global FDI.1 On the other hand, China’s rapid economic
growth in recent decades has been accompanied by severe environmental degradation
such as over-exploitation and mass industrial pollution, typical problems in developing
countries. Meanwhile, China is a large country with substantial differences in the
distribution of FDI and the environmental quality of its regions, which provides us
with enough variation to identify the pollution haven effect.
1Based on the statistics from The CIA World Factbook on 2013
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In a 2007 report, the World Bank estimated that pollution resulted in a 5.78%
decline of China’s GDP caused by premature deaths of the labor force, health care
costs, and material damages.2 Moreover, with the level of annual average particulate
matter of less than 10 µm in diameter (PM10) concentrations being higher than
100 Ig/m3 in several selected cities, China has overtaken the United States as the
world’s largest producer of carbon dioxide, the chief greenhouse gas. To control
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, the Chinese government in 1998 implemented a new
regulatory policy, “Acid Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Emission Zones,” namely, the TCZ
policy. The policy package covers a total of 1.09 million square kilometers, comprising
175 cities and districts in 27 provinces, which account for about 11.4% of the entire
territory of China.
To shed light on the effect of the pollution haven effect, this paper compiles de-
tailed Chinese provincial-level data to assess the impact of environmental stringency
on the location choice of FDI inflows by province. The study employs a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach by exploring time and cross-sectional variation. As FDI
into a host region may depend on the FDI in neighboring regions, it also uses the
spatial error model to account for third-region effects in FDI inflows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly summarizes related
studies in the existing pollution haven literature and introduces the contribution of
this paper. Section 4.3 presents a brief description of the institutional background of
environmental regulations in China. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical methodology
of estimating the pollution haven effect. Data sources and summary statistics are
also provided. Section 4.5 explains the empirical findings of the DID estimators and
several robustness checks, followed by concluding remarks in Section 4.6.
2World Bank. 2007. Cost of pollution in China : economic estimates of physical damages.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
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4.2 Literature Review
The possibility that polluting multinational enterprises (MNEs) outsource produc-
tion activities to developing countries with less stringent environmental regulation
has been labeled as the “Pollution Haven Hypothesis” (PHH), for which empirical
support is weak. After all, trade theory suggests that many other factors in addition
to pollution regulations, affect trade flows (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Although
the PHH cannot be easily proven, we can address the pollution haven effect: a tight-
ening up of pollution regulation will have an effect on plant location decisions and
trade flows (Taylor, 2004). Most empirical studies attempting to address the pol-
lution haven effect have yielded, at best, mixed results. Until quite recently, PHH
studies have reached a consensus that differences in the stringency of environmental
regulations have little or no effect on trade and investment flows. By using a condi-
tional logit model to analyze the site selection of all MNEs, Friedman, Gerlowski, and
Silberman (1992) show that nearness to markets is the dominant factor influencing
the location decision of foreign manufacturing branch plants. List (1999) presents
evidence that air pollution emissions in the U.S. converged during the 1929-1994 pe-
riod, suggesting that states in the U.S. do not compete for industries by loosening
environmental regulations. Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) examine the pattern of
FDI inflows across Chinese provinces to test whether foreign firms embodying less
efficient abatement technologies are more responsive to inter-provincial differences
in environmental regulations. Their finding confirms that only ethnically Chinese
investors are significantly sensitive to the provincial differences while non-ethnically
Chinese investors transferring relatively advanced technologies show no significant
response.
The early literature typically provides no supporting evidence for the pollution
haven effect, yet later studies tend to find a statistically significant, but economi-
cally mild effect of environmental regulations on industry composition. For example,
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Becker and Henderson (2000) use panel data from 1963 to 1992 and find that air-
quality regulations cause the firm birth rate in polluting industries to drop by 26-45%.
Industries with bigger plants are affected the most, shifting the industrial structure
toward less-regulated single-plant firms. To assess the impact of environmental strin-
gency on capital flows, Keller and Lenvinson (2002), List and Co (2000), and List
et. al (2003) explore regulatory costs that deter investment in U.S. states with rela-
tively more stringent environmental regulations. These U.S. studies argue that lack
of evidence for PHH in earlier studies may arise from a failure to account for endo-
geneity problems and measurement error. The empirical challenge to addressing the
pollution haven effect is how to deal with the potential endogeneity of environmental
regulations. Recent studies started to explore the potential endogeneity of environ-
mental regulations. Using instrumental variable (IV) estimation, Millimet and Roy
(2011) find (i) evidence of such endogenous regulations, (ii) a negative impact of local
environmental regulations on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive sectors, particularly
when measured by employment, and (iii) larger effects of environmental regulations
once endogeneity is addressed.
Using the change in environmental regulations, specifically, the 1998 TCZ environ-
mental policy in China, my study is similar to and complements the empirical work.
For example, Tanaka (2010) proves that by imposing stringent regulations on pollu-
tant emissions from power plants, the TCZ policy has led to significant reductions in
air pollution and infant mortality rate. Recent work by Lu, Wu, and Yu (2012) uses
a DID approach to find that being listed as a TCZ city in China causes the amount of
FDI to drop by 25.6%. To explore the effect of TCZ policy on a firm’s export activity,
Hering and Poncet (2014) show that state-owned firms are less intensively affected
and thus able to export relatively more. However, a relative decline has existed in
exports of both foreign and private firms: If a sector uses more energy, its exports
tend to decline more profoundly.
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This paper builds on the existing literature in several ways. As empirical work al-
lowing for third-region effects is sparse, it extends Lu, Wu, and Yu (2012) by assuming
a spatial correlation of FDI inflow across provinces when estimating the environmen-
tal stringency effect. By combining the DID estimation of the TCZ policy effect and
spatial autocorrelations among regions, I find that previous DID analysis has, to some
extent, overestimated the effect of the TCZ policy. In addition, using province-level
data enables us to obtain a unique TCZ Index (area percentage of TCZ cities) for
each province and helps me improve the level of accuracy in my estimation of the
policy effect. Specifically, for each province, there is a distinct TCZ index, so the
estimated policy effect differs across regions.
4.3 Environmental Policies and FDI in China
4.3.1 Two Control Zones policy
Deeply concerned by the effects of increasing air pollution on the environment, human
health, and life, the Chinese government adopted a series of environmental regula-
tions. Known as the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPCL), the first
version of the environmental legislation in China was enacted in 1987 and executed
in 1988. This environmental law did not yield the expected outcomes. Because it did
not present any concrete policies on how to control SO2 emissions and specify which
government body should be responsible for enforcing the policies (Lu, Wu, and Yu,
2012), SO2 emissions were still increasing, and areas affected by acid rain expanded.
In 1995, the Chinese government amended the 1987 APPCL. The major part of the
amendment includes a section that regulates pollutant emissions and coal combustion,
particularly by high sulfur-content coal at power plants (Hao et. al, 2001).
After the enforcement of 1995 APPCL, pollution regulations that control SO2
emissions became substantially more stringent. In January 1998, with the approval of
the document “The Official Reply of the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control
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Areas and SO2 Pollution Control Areas,” the Chinese State Council implemented a
new policy entitled “Acid Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Emission Zones,” namely the Two
Control Zones (TCZ) policy. Based on records from preceding years, prefectures
were designated as Acid Rain Control Zones if they had average annual pH values
for precipitation of less than or equal to 4.5, sulfur deposition above the critical
load, and a high recorded level of SO2 emission. The SO2 Pollution Control Zones
included cities with high levels of SO2 emissions and annual average ambient SO2
concentrations above the second level defined by the National Ambient Air Quality
Standard (NAAQS) or daily concentrations exceeding the third level of the NAAQS.
Figure 1: Distribution of Two Control Zones cities
Source: Hering and Poncet (2014)
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Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of TCZ cities in China. The policy
covers a total of 1.09 million square kilometers, comprising 175 cities in 27 provinces
that account for about 11.4% of the entire territory of China. Other characteristics
of the Two Control Zones are shown in Table 28. SO2 emissions in the TCZ areas
accounted for 58.9% of the national total, which implies that acid rain and SO2
pollution in China would not deteriorate if SO2 emission could be well controlled in
the treatment areas (Hao et. al, 2001). Generally, whereas SO2 pollution control
zones are located in northern China because of its heating system, acid rain control
zones are located in southern China, where the climate is relatively more humid. Air
quality in the TCZ area is measured by ambient SO2 and NO2 concentrations as well
as the level of total suspended particles (TSP).
Table 28: Characteristics of the Two Control Zones in 1995
Items SO2 Control Acid Rain Control Two Control Zones
Area% 3.0 8.4 11.4
Population% 9.7 30.9 40.6
GDP% 18.2 44.2 62.4
SO2 emission% 25.4 33.5 58.9
Specifically, the provisions included in the TCZ policy are as follows:
1. Any new coal mines with a sulfur content greater than 3.0% cannot be estab-
lished, and the existing mines are gradually shut down or required to limit output.
2. Construction of any new coal-burning thermal power plant will not be approved
in cities or suburbs of large and medium-size cities; for newly built or rebuilt ther-
mal power plants, if the sulfur content in burning coal exceeds 1.0%, desulfurization
facilities must be installed.
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3. Existing plants should take measures to reduce SO2 emissions and install flue
gas desulfurization (FGD) facilities.
The effectiveness of these regulatory actions are documented in various studies.
Table 29 presents a list of all Chinese mainland provinces, their geographical locations,
their TCZ Indexes, and total volume of SO2 emissions in the year 1998 and 2000.
The numbers in parentheses represent the volume of discharge in the TCZ area of
each province in the year 2000. A comparison of the last two columns shows that SO2
emissions decreased in most provinces after the cut-off year of 1998. For example, in
Beijing, the total volume of emissions dropped from 305.1 to 224 thousand tons in
2000, and the percentage of SO2 pollution emitted by TCZ area accounted for more
than 95% of the total. In some provinces(e.g., Tianjing, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Jilin),
SO2 emission increased from 1998 to 2000.
4.3.2 FDI trends and determinants
Empirical researchers on FDI have engaged in a heated debate on what the determi-
nants of the location of FDI are. By estimating the effects of the determinants of FDI
in 29 Chinese regions from 1985 to 1995, Cheng and Kwan (2000) find that a large
regional market, good infrastructure, and preferential policy affect FDI inflows posi-
tively, but wage cost affect them negatively. The effect of education is positive, but it
is not statistically significant. In addition, FDI also has a strong self-reinforcing effect.
Consistent with the theoretical considerations and empirical observations mentioned
above, the existing literature has pointed out the importance of five sets of variables:
(a) access to national and regional markets; (b) wage costs adjusted for the quality
and the productivity of the labor force and other labor market conditions such as
unemployment and the degree of unionization; (c) policies toward FDI, including tax
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Table 29: List of Chinese mainland provinces and volume of SO2 discharge (10,000
tons)
Code Province Location TCZ % 1998SO2 2000SO2
1 Beijing North 0.4816 30.51 22.40(21.59)
2 Tianjing North-Coastal 0.3637 22.99 32.99(25.64)
3 Hebei North-Coastal 0.8533 140.29 132.13(80.32)
4 Shanxi North 0.6136 141.99 120.16(73.71)
5 Inner-Mongolia North 0.1163 72.8 66.38(35.80)
6 Liaoning North-Coastal 0.6143 99.19 93.24(55.00)
7 Jilin North 0.3009 28.39 28.57(9.00)
8 Heilongjiang North 0 30.01 29.66(N/A)
9 Shanghai Coastal 1 48.89 46.50(46.50)
10 Jiangsu Coastal 0.5868 125.46 120.18(100.00)
11 Zhejiang Coastal 0.8201 65.98 59.28(56.25)
12 Anhui Interior 0.2391 42.36 39.53(14.30)
13 Fujian Coastal 0.6411 16.49 22.50(19.37)
14 Jiangxi Interior 0.435 30.46 32.31(16.60)
15 Shandong North-Coastal 0.4861 225.89 179.59(116.30)
16 Henan North 0.2662 100.29 87.69(46.33)
17 Hubei Interior 0.2974 56.88 56.04(40.21)
18 Hunan Interior 0.7248 72.21 77.25(67.30)
19 Guangdong Coastal 0.7126 67.88 90.47(81.83)
20 Guangxi Coastal 0.6302 70.09 83.03(63.75)
21 Hainan Coastal 0 2.04 2.04(N/A)
22 Chongqing West 0.3237 68.05 83.94(69.20)
23 Sichuan West 0.2576 140.77 122.30(99.30)
24 Guizhou West 0.2728 192.79 145.01(84.92)
25 Yunnan West 0.2239 36 38.59(27.24)
26 Tibet Interior-West 0 0.14 0.08(N/A)
27 Shaanxi North-West 0.2249 66.02 62.33(23.41)
28 Gansu North-West 0.1812 38.35 36.85(25.58)
29 Qinghai North-West 0 3.14 3.2(N/A)
30 Ningxia North-West 0.2229 21.52 20.58(7.77)
31 Xinjiang North-West 0.0084 33.56 31.05(9.18)
Source: Chinese Environment Yearbook
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rates; (d) the availability and quality of the infrastructure, and (e) the economies of
agglomeration.
To experiment with an appropriate choice of each set of variables and following
Cheng and Kwan (2000), I include several proxies. The proxies for infrastructure
variables are the value of foreign capital by contracts, the retail sales of social con-
sumption goods, the area of paved roads per capita, and number of buses each year.
For labor productivity, they are the total number of employees of all industries, the
average annual wages of employees, the annual output of all industries, and the num-
ber of high school students. For the economies of agglomeration, I use the value and
the growth rate of the province-level GDP , and the value of province-specific retail
consumption goods. For access to national and regional markets, I use a location
dummy variable North, spatial FDI and its lagged terms, and the surrounding GDPs.
The policy variable used here refers to the coastal dummy. In China, Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZs) 3 and Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) 4 are the two most important
policy designations for attracting inflows of FDI. Additionally, they are, to a certain
extent, confined to a small subset of regions along the coast.
4.4 Empirical Methods
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Following the baseline DID estimation framework in Lu, Wu, and Yu (2012), my
analysis exploits the TCZ environmental policy, implemented in 1998 as a quasi-
natural experiment. Specifically, whereas the treatment group comprises the cities
designated as TCZ areas in 1998, the control group includes those not receiving TCZ
policy intervention in 1998. From a comparison of the outcome variable for TCZ
3As part of China’s economic reforms and openness policy, SEZs were established to attract and
utilize foreign capital investments. In 1980, the first four SEZs were Shantou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai
in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province.
4In the early 1980s, 14 coastal cities were granted the status of OCCs. The special policies
granted these cities loose regulations from the central government and brought rapid development
along the coast.
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regions with that for non-TCZ regions before and after the policy change, I identify
the pollution haven effect from the following DID regression:
lnFDIit = αi + λt + γTCZi × Postt +X ′itβ + εit (27)
where i denotes the region in year t; αi is the region fixed effect capturing all time-
invariant characteristics; λt is the year fixed effect and Xit controls for other potential
determinants of FDI inflows as discussed in the previous section so as to isolate the
effect of environmental policy. The DID estimator in this equation is the interaction
between the indicator of the treatment status TCZi and that of the post-treatment
period Postt.
For the interaction term, TCZi is the index calculating the area percentage of
TCZ cities in each region. Hence, for each province, it is a unique number between
0 and 1 . The closer it is to 1, the larger the area that is receiving TCZ treatment.
Postt indicates the post-treatment period,
Postt =

1 ∀t ≥ 1998
0 otherwise
(28)
and εit is the error term. Consequently, the identification assumption requires
that the regressor of interest, TCZi × Postt, which is conditional on a complete list
of control variables (αi, λt, Xit), be uncorrelated with the error term, εit, i.e.,
E [εit|TCZi × Postt, αi, λt, Xit] = E [εit|αi, λt, Xit] (29)
According to previous quantitative analysis, the TCZ designation is not deter-
mined by past economic performance and political considerations, in particular, the
growth prospect of FDI (Lu, Wu, and Yu, 2012). However, several concerns might
be raised before my identification assumption is satisfied. One potential concern is
the existence of some unidentified pre-existing trends that may affect both the TCZ
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status and ex-post- FDI inflows between the treatment and control groups. To al-
leviate the common serial correlation issue in my DID analysis, I remove the time
series dimension by aggregating the data into two periods: pre- and post-intervention.
According to Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), collapsing the data into pre-
and post-periods produces consistent standard errors in a DID approach, even when
the number of states is small (although the power of this test declines fast). More-
over, to identify the difference between the DID estimator of the TCZ and that of
the non-TCZ group, I use the TCZ Index of each province to replace the province
dummy to see if the result changes. In addition, to avoid the over-rejection problem,
I cluster standard errors by province.
Another potential concern in satisfying the identification assumption regards the
timing of the change in the environmental policy. Specifically, because of the two-
year gap between compilation of the TCZ list in late 1995 and the date it took effect,
one may be concerned about whether any expectation effect, that is, the effect of
environmental regulation on FDI, occurred before the effective date of the policy. As
a robustness check, I conduct a placebo test by using 1995 instead of 1998 as the
time of treatment. Given that the TCZ became policy only after 1998, the use of
1995 as the beginning of treatment should not produce a significant treatment effect.
For additional checks on the identification assumption, I include average wages of
employees to identify a negative wage effect. Considering that the economic effect of
FDI inflows is continuous, I then add cumulative FDI. Moreover, to identify a large-
scale effect of China’s open policy, I include only non-coastal regions as a robustness
check.
4.4.2 Data
To determine the impact of the TCZ policy, the empirical analysis includes three
major data sources that trace the yearly evolution of FDI inflows, air quality, and
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various economic characteristics across provinces. The first data source is the Chinese
City Statistical Yearbook (2012)5, which aggregates yearly data about the outcome
variable of the real amount of FDI used for each region from 1988 to 2012. I also
use this data source to compile data on the control variables Xit, such as the values
of FDI contracts, the number of industrial enterprises, and employment as the entire
labor supply; and potential determinants used in the investigation on the designa-
tion of the TCZ status, such as the number of high school students each year, the
area of paved roads per capita, the gross value of yearly industrial output, and the
total sales of retail consumption goods. The second data source is the China En-
vironment Yearbook (2012), which covers all basic data related to the environment
at the national level and at the provincial level (i.e., provinces, autonomous regions,
and municipalities directly under the control of the central government), and main
statistical data on the environment in relevant years of China. As an annual statistics
publication, it is complied jointly by the National Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry
of Environmental Protection, and other ministries, reflecting basic situation of all
aspects of environment in China. I obtain information about the annual discharge of
SO2 at the industrial level and the household level from 1988 to 2012.
The third data source is the 1998 State Council’s official document “The Official
Reply of the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and Sulfur Dioxide
Pollution Control Areas.” It provides a detailed list of cities assigned as the Acid
Rain Control Zone, and the ones assigned as the SO2 Control Zone. Among the 280
cities for which the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook has information 158 are TCZ
cities. During the sample period (1988-2012), the composition of this list remained
unchanged, and all TCZ designations are reported in the document. As these three
sources of data had missing values, I complemented the data from these sources by
downloading several economic variables from city statistics collected by the National
5China Statistics Press, National Bureau of Statistics of China http://csp.stats.gov.cn/
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Bureau of Statistics of China at China Data Online 6 from the Michigan China
Data Center. These included yearly indices of the GDP, the number of industrial
enterprises, and the gross industrial output.
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 30 presents the details of the summary statistics and the description of the
key variables in estimating the effect of the TCZ policy. The data set covers the 31
contiguous Chinese provinces from 1988 to 2012. One point worth clarifying is that
Chongqing Municipality lacks data for six of the years under study because it did
not become an administrative district until it separated from Sichuan Province in
1997. To retain consistency and avoid omitting data, I chose to separate the data of
Chongqing Province from that of Sichuan Province from 1988 to 1996, treating these
two provinces as separate during the entire time frame.
The measures of FDI include the yearly amount of real FDI received for all manu-
facturers within a region and the amount of investment from foreign-owned affiliates
each year according to signed contracts. Since the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook
does not have information about FDI for each industry or sector, I have to examine
the average effect across all industries instead of the differential impact of pollut-
ing and non-polluting industries. For all variables related to FDI, GDP, or wages,
I compute real values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each year. “Retail
consumption,” an economic indicator compiled and released by the Census Bureau
and the Department of Commerce, serves as an aggregated measure of the sales of re-
tail goods to the entire country. “Number of buses” refers to all publicly-owned buses
under the operated transit system. “Coastal” refers to 11 provinces: Tianjin, Hebei,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hainan. “Northern” includes 15 provinces such as Beijing, Jilin, Shanxi, Inner Mon-
golia, Gansu, and another ten provinces located in northern China.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Main Results
Table 31 reports the baseline regression results from estimating the DID estimation
equation (1) over the 1988-2012 time period. From columns 1 to 4, the estimated
DID coefficients are consistently negative. Three are statistically significant and com-
parable in magnitude. Such findings imply that regions with tougher environmental
regulations attracted a smaller amount of FDI, confirming the pollution haven hy-
pothesis. Specifically, by ignoring the time-series dimension and simply dividing the
data into pre- and post-1998 periods, column 1 presents basic estimation results.
Columns 2-3 show a comparison between using a dummy for each province and not
using a dummy. Without region dummies a TCZ dummy replaces the region dummy;
and in this case, because no region dummy is omitted, column 3 shows that the
number of observations is larger. Column 4 shows baseline DID results with more
accurate estimates when error terms are clustered at the provincial level.
The economic magnitude of the pollution haven effect is significant. On average,
for a province with 10% of its area designated as TCZ cities, the implementation of
the TCZ policy led to a drop in the amount of FDI by 30.67%. This decrease is
comparable to the effects found in the literature. For instance, Becker and Henderson
(2000) find that tougher environment regulations result in a decrease in the birth
rates of companies in polluting industries by 26 to 45%. Kellenberg (2009) estimates
that between 1999 and 2003, the environmental policy caused the value added of U.S.
affiliates located in countries in the top 20th percentile to grow by approximately
8.6%, while the corresponding number for developing and transition economies in the
top 20th percentile was 32%. Hanna (2010) finds that the Clean Air Act Amendments
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Table 31: Baseline DID Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No time-series w/ Regiond w/o Regiond w/ Cluster s.e
TCZ*post -3.018∗∗∗ -3.067∗∗∗ -0.381 -3.067∗∗∗
(-5.12) (-4.64) (-1.19) (-5.09)
GDP(log) 0.047 0.363 0.726∗∗∗ 0.363
(0.13) (1.01) (3.20) (0.53)
GDP growth 2.803∗ 2.887 7.643∗∗∗ 2.887
(1.84) (1.56) (3.99) (1.19)
Retail (log) 1.367∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗ 0.430∗ 1.162
(3.24) (2.29) (1.75) (1.46)
Contract(log) 0.219∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(2.84) (3.10) (9.62) (2.43)
No.firms(log) -0.162 -0.146 0.097 -0.146
(-0.83) (-0.81) (0.75) (-0.55)
Employment(log) -0.318∗ -0.795∗∗ -0.029 -0.795
(-1.69) (-2.55) (-0.18) (-1.66)
Buses(log) -0.266 -0.286 0.204∗∗∗ -0.286
(-1.25) (-1.43) (2.88) (-1.06)
Highschool(log) -0.325∗ 0.172 -0.050 0.172
(-1.96) (0.70) (-0.37) (0.46)
SO2 emission(log) 0.266∗ 0.281∗ -0.087 0.281
(1.86) (1.74) (-2.92) (1.65)
Ind.Output(log) 0.065 -0.105 -0.805∗∗∗ -0.105
(0.57) (-0.69) (-5.94) (-0.54)
Road(log) 0.154 0.214 0.256∗∗∗ 0.214
(0.99) (1.49) (3.42) (1.09)
North 1.049∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ -0.003 1.197∗∗∗
(5.55) (6.11) (-0.04) (6.04)
Coastal 2.072∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗
(6.16) (5.16) (2.21) (4.28)
Region dummy Y Y N Y
Year dummy N Y Y Y
TCZ Index N N 0.228 N
(0.87)
Constant -14.29∗∗∗ -13.07∗∗∗ -12.15∗∗∗ -13.07
(-4.04) (-2.60) (-4.59) (-1.55)
Observations 270 270 352 270
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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over the 1966-1999 period increased the foreign assets of U.S. multinationals by 5.3%
and foreign output by 9%. The estimated coefficients of other economic determinants
of FDI also make economic sense. Each year, larger aggregated values of signed
contracts attracted more foreign investment by about 23.9%. In addition, FDI is
clustered in regions with larger domestic consumption; and foreign firms are more
likely to locate in coastal than in interior regions but are less likely to locate in
northern than southern areas.
4.5.2 Robustness Checks
Table 32 presents the results of a number of robustness checks. After probing the
robustness of the estimates to determine the sensitivity of the DID estimation results,
I find little evidence contradicting the basic conclusions discussed above. Specifically,
I first add the wage effect into the baseline DID equation to determine if the average
wage of employees has a negative effect on FDI inflows as predicted by the previous
FDI literature. According to the results in Column 1, the estimated decrease in FDI
inflows is around 33% less when the wage effect is taken into account. The estimated
coefficient of the average wage is negative, as expected, but not statistically significant.
In the second column, I use 1995 as the cut-off year to check the existence of an
expectation effect of the TCZ policy. The estimated coefficient of the interaction
term TCZ*post is much smaller in magnitude and less significant. Provided that
a trend break indeed existed around 1998 and considering the expectation effect,
using 1995 is likely to understate the policy impact while still producing statistical
significance at the conventional level. In addition, the results in Column 3 show
that calculating cumulative FDI for each province still leads to a highly statistically
significant DID estimator that changes very little. Column 4 shows the estimation
results in the sub-group of non-coastal regions. Although the estimated magnitude
is smaller, it is still negative and significant. In summary, although the identification
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Table 32: Falsification Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incl. wage Use year 1995 w/ FDI Stock Non-coastal only
TCZ*post -2.019∗∗∗ -1.004∗∗ -3.038∗∗∗ -0.911∗∗∗
(-3.32) (-2.67) (-4.92) (-3.07)
GDP(log) 0.363 0.036 0.365 0.419
(0.80) (0.08) (0.53) (0.65)
GDP growth 2.751 2.497 2.928 3.975
(1.14) (1.01) (1.21) (1.45)
Retail(log) 0.410∗∗ 0.563∗∗ 1.155 1.184∗
(2.41) (2.47) (1.50) (1.95)
No.firms(log) -0.140 -0.476 -0.145 -0.216∗
(-0.53) (-1.60) (-0.54) (-1.78)
Employment(log) -0.738 -0.428 -0.796 -1.031∗∗∗
(-1.56) (-0.83) (-1.67) (-2.99)
Buses(log) -0.313 -0.300 -0.285 0.148
(-1.12) (-1.06) (-0.84) (0.31)
Highschool(log) 0.164 0.172 0.170 0.288
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (1.07)
SO2 emission(log) 0.422∗∗ 0.146 0.277 -0.282∗
(2.03) (0.77) (1.60) (-2.04)
Ind.Output(log) -0.080 -0.105 -0.107 -0.739∗
(-0.41) (-0.54) (-0.57) (-2.28)
Road(log) 0.222 0.214 0.156 -0.143
(1.11) (1.09) (0.80) (-0.60)
Contract(log) 0.605∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(6.84) (3.26) (2.47) (3.93)
Avg.wage(log) -0.225
(-0.19)
North -1.573∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ -0.0664
(-4.57) (-2.59) (6.20) (-0.34)
Coastal 1.101∗∗∗ 0.186 1.921∗∗∗
(3.18) (0.86) (4.05)
Region dummy Y Y Y Y
Year dummy Y Y Y Y
Cumulative FDI 0.007
(0.40)
Constant -13.92 -13.07 -13.39 -15.70∗∗
(-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.59) (-3.07)
Observations 270 270 270 270
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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assumption of the DID estimation cannot be fully verified, the analysis conducted
in this subsection increases the confidence that the baseline DID estimates may not
suffer from severe estimation bias.
In addition to the baseline regression results and their robustness checks, Table
33 summarizes the results of a simple quantile regression. Although most of the
empirical literature has used ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to identify the
linear effect of regressors, the OLS method has its own constraints, among which
the most significant is that all the coefficients are estimated at the mean level. It
is highly sensitive to outliers that lie far away from the average. To overcome such
shortcomings of my OLS results, I use quantile estimation to capture the change in
the policy effect at four quantiles of FDI inflows. Table 33 shows that the estimated
regulation effect is larger at the median level of FDI than at the 25th and 75th
quantiles. All of them are comparable to the baseline linear estimators.
4.5.3 Spatial analysis
In the empirical FDI literature, models with a third-party effect have been used to
address the spatial interdependence of the FDI determinants. Drukker and Millimet
(2007) provides the first theoretical and empirical analysis that merges the literature
on environmental regulation and capital flows with that on third-country effects in
the FDI location choice. Using U.S. state-level data, they find that, although state
attributes rarely have statistically significant effects on their inbound U.S. FDI, many
neighboring state attributes matter both economically and statistically. In addition,
they find that using recently derived spatial-econometric methods produces results
that better concur with the theoretical model than methods that ignore that spatial
auto-correlation.
As pointed by Drukker and Millimet (2007), research into the validity of the PHH
must account for spatial spillover, as third-country effects are present in analyses of
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Table 33: Quantile Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Results 25th quantile 50th quantile 75th quantile
TCZ*post -3.067∗∗∗ -2.727∗∗∗ -3.292∗∗∗ -2.896∗∗∗
(-5.09) (-4.51) (-6.68) (-3.73)
GDP(log) 0.363 1.027∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.370
(0.53) (3.10) (3.02) (0.87)
GDP growth 2.887 1.960 1.103 1.029
(1.19) (0.91) (0.63) (0.37)
Retail(log) 1.162 -0.000 1.002∗∗∗ 0.977∗
(1.46) (-0.00) (3.15) (1.95)
Contract(log) 0.231∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(2.43) (5.65) (6.26) (3.92)
No.firms(log) -0.146 -0.032 -0.206 -0.160
(-0.55) (-0.18) (-1.44) (-0.71)
Employment(log) -0.795 -1.033∗∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗ -0.792∗
(-1.66) (-3.14) (-3.99) (-1.88)
Buses(log) -0.286 0.138 -0.227 -0.224
(-1.06) (0.65) (-1.30) (-0.82)
Highschool(log) 0.172 0.265 0.109 0.158
(0.46) (0.91) (0.46) (0.42)
SO2 emission(log) 0.281 0.188 0.371∗∗∗ 0.205
(1.65) (1.30) (3.16) (1.11)
Ind.Output(log) -0.105 -0.103 -0.139 0.009
(-0.54) (-0.45) (-0.75) (0.03)
Road(log) 0.214 0.170 0.183 0.172
(1.09) (1.04) (1.37) (0.82)
North 1.197∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗
(6.04) (4.71) (6.82) (5.03)
Coastal 1.948∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 1.920∗∗∗ 1.697∗∗∗
(4.28) (5.92) (6.77) (3.80)
Region dummy Y Y Y Y
Year dummy Y Y Y Y
Constant -13.07 -8.080 -13.89∗∗∗ -9.720
(-1.55) (-1.69) (-3.57) (-1.58)
Observations 270 270 270 270
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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the impact of environmental regulations on capital flows. Specifically, province-level
environmental regulations are strongly related to the regulatory stringency of neigh-
boring states. To account for such third-country effects, Coughlin and Segev (2000)
find empirical evidence for a spatial error model, as shocks to FDI are correlated
across provinces. However, Blonigen et. al (2007) choose the spatial lag model over
the spatial error model. While the former allows the data to reveal patterns of sub-
stitution or complementarity as well as the strength of any such patterns through the
estimated spatial coefficient, the spatial error model is silent with respect to evidence
of the substitution or complementarity of FDI across countries; therefore, it does not
inform theory.
My study follows the spatial approach in Blonigen et al. (2007) and uses the
spatial weight matrix W to capture the proximity of a specific host to other host
provinces by measuring the distances between host provinces. This matrix is used
to construct the spatial lag term W · FDI and the surrounding-market potential
measure, another spatial lag term W · GDP . The standard literature of spatial
analysis generally claims that regions with close geographical proximity tend to have
a greater impact on each other than regions that are far apart. In other words, a short
distance between two regions could indicate that they are closely interconnected in
terms of economic activities while a long distance could indicate regions that may not
influence each other significantly.
Following Blonigen et. al (2007),
FDIit = β0+β1Host V ar.it+β2SurroundingMktPotentialt+ρ·W ·FDIt+εit. (30)
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Here W denotes a full spatial weight matrix, s.t.
W =

W1988 0 0 · · · 0
0 W1989 0 · · · 0






0 0 0 · · · W2012

(31)







Table 34 summarizes the results of spatial regression. Column 2, which adds time-
lagged FDI, shows that ignoring a region’s own FDI inflows in the previous year leads
to an over-estimated policy effect. Moreover, I add spatially-weighted GDP as the
measure of the surrounding market in column 3 and spatially-weighted FDI in column
4. The estimated coefficients are consistently negative and increase in magnitude,
confirming the finding of third-country effects in the FDI literature. Specifically,
the spatial lag model results in Column 4 suggest that FDI inflow into neighboring
regions has a negative effect on a region’s own investment inflow. Without considering
a third-region effect, previous DID estimations have overestimated the TCZ policy
effect. A more precise prediction would be that, on average, a province with 10% of
its area designated as a TCZ group has a 26.5% decrease in its FDI inflows annually.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the relationships among environmental policies, capital flows, and
trade flows is an important and timely topic. While the literature on capital flows
has recognized the importance of third-country effects, the literature on the pollution
haven effect has yet to do so. This paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge
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Table 34: Spatial Lag Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline w/ lag FDI w/ weighted GDP w/ spatial FDI
TCZ*post -3.067∗∗∗ -2.990∗∗∗ -2.809∗∗∗ -2.650∗∗
(-5.09) (-4.77) (-4.69) (-2.32)
GDP(log) 0.363 0.337 0.282 0.908*
(0.53) (0.52) (0.42) (1.90)
GDP growth 2.887 2.979 3.336 -3.996
(1.19) (1.20) (1.40) (-1.39)
Retail(log) 1.162 1.163 1.065 -0.708
(1.46) (1.45) (1.28) (-0.63)
No.firms(log) -0.146 -0.157 -0.135 0.373
(-0.55) (-0.63) (-0.53) (1.13)
Employment(log) -0.795 -0.793 -0.789 -0.384
(-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.66) (-0.59)
Buses(log) -0.286 -0.283 -0.283 -0.175
(-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-0.48)
Highschool(log) 0.172 0.179 0.152 -0.203
(0.46) (0.49) (0.42) (-0.53)
SO2 emission(log) 0.281 0.270 0.255 0.514∗∗
(1.65) (1.52) (1.52) (2.46)
Ind.Output(log) -0.105 -0.094 -0.089 0.397
(-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.47) (0.71)
Road(log) 0.214 0.203 0.199 0.355
(1.09) (1.08) (1.06) (1.27)
Contract(log) 0.231∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗
(2.43) (2.53) (2.57) (5.95)
North 1.197∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗ -0.592
(6.04) (6.73) (2.56) (-0.84)
Coastal 1.948∗∗∗ 1.883∗∗∗ 1.656∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗
(4.28) (3.70) (3.26) (3.09)
Time lagged FDI 0.025 0.029
(0.42) (0.49)




Constant -13.07 -13.08 -39.32 0.637
(-1.55) (-1.56) (-1.08) (0.01)
Observations 270 270 270 270
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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by merging them to investigate whether the existence of a pollution haven effect more
precisely.
By using a change in environmental policy, namely the 1998 TCZ policy in China,
to control for the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations, and tracing the
change of FDI inflows for 31 provinces over the 1988-2012 period, I found that on
average, provinces with 10% city areas designated as TCZ attract around 26.5% less
FDI than their non-TCZ counterparts. My results were robust to a series of robustness
checks on the identification assumption along with other economic concerns. Ignoring




The precise impact of environmental regulations on trade growth has been a central
preoccupation of the international trade-environment debate in the recent decades.
Due to limited data availability on global environmental agreements and policies, ex-
isting studies addressing the effect of IEAs/MEAs are rare. This dissertation is the
first investigation on international trade flows with comprehensive IEA data rather
than some particular multinational environmental regulations or standards. After in-
troductory remarks of the first chapter, the second chapter takes a first step to analyse
the general impacts of multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on interna-
tional bilateral trade flows, following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The results imply
that environmental agreements have no deterring impact on member countries’ trade
growth. When the positive effect of trade agreements are also taken into account,
the results show that country pairs signing a free trade agreement and an environ-
mental agreement together have an even larger increase in trade volume than their
non-member counterparts. The subsequent findings when MEAs are separated into
groups of different categories/sizes are consistent with the baseline results: environ-
mental agreements and trade growth are actually reinforcing each other. Additionally,
it addresses an individual impact specific to every environmental agreement in the
current dataset.
The third chapter examines the specific role of IEAs on member countries’ bi-
lateral intensive and extensive margins. Using five-year first differencing estimation
methods I find that IEA membership generally decreases two trading countries’ bilat-
eral intensive margin by 10.68% within a 5-10 year time period, and leads to an even
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larger reduction at 21.73% after 15 years. While the existence of a negative effect
from environmental agreements is addressed, it is more than offset by the positive
effect of trade agreements should one be in place. When two countries have both a
pollution and a trade agreement in place, the combined effect on the intensive mar-
gin is an increase of 27.14%. My results confirm that environmental agreements and
trade growth are reinforcing each other.
The fourth chapter compiles detailed Chinese provincial-level data to assess the
precise impact of environmental stringency on the location choice of FDI inflows by
province. By focusing on a particular environmental policy, namely the 1998 TCZ
policy in China, to control for the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations,
and tracing the change of FDI inflows for 31 provinces over the 1988-2012 period,
I find that on average, provinces with 10% city areas designated as TCZ attract
around 26.5% less FDI than their non-TCZ counterparts. My results are robust to a
series of robustness checks on the identification assumption along with other economic
concerns. As FDI into a host region may depend on the FDI in neighboring regions,
it also uses the spatial error model to account for third-region effects in FDI inflows.
As results show, ignoring the spatial correlation of provincial FDI inflows led to an
overestimated policy effect.
For future research, I wish to go broadly further in the following aspects. First,
this thesis places more emphasis on investigating the aggregate effect of IEAs by con-
sidering the presence of environmental agreements rather than the number of IEAs
between each country pair. It is possible that using the number of IEAs as indicators
in the generalist approach could generate more detailed results of the overall IEA im-
pact. Also, different IEAs have diversified characteristics such as the types, subjects,
coverage, signature date, lineages, and number of signatories. All of which may have
a differential impact on international trade. Conducting more detailed investigations
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on these heterogenous design of MEAs as well as their statuses of regulation imple-
mentation could provide more insights on the specialist approach. Additionally, the
difference between the announcement and ratification date of every environmental
agreement may bias the results. The upgrade or amendment of existing agreements
may or may not affect firms’ behavior, hence the influences on international trade are
quite unclear. There is also one more approach to be fulfilled. The environmental
agreement dummies could be further separated to indicate whether the agreement in
question is the first, second, third, and so on agreement between the two countries,
so as to enable future studies to have a more detailed investigation of the differential
timing impact for each IEA.
When it comes to the evaluation of trade impact, using a single dummy variable
standing for environmental agreements provides me with a limited capacity to ex-
amine their effects in detail. For instance, MEAs dealing with pollution of air and
oceans may have a larger effect on bilateral trade in energy-intensive sectors, while
agreements on species and habitats will have relatively smaller effects on international
competitiveness. Using highly aggregated data on either trade volume or numbers
of environmental agreements provides us with limited results. I could either recode
the data to associate industries with agreements, or use data disaggregated to the
SITC 4-digit data level, which would address the data aggregation issue and lead to
some new findings. Furthermore, existing studies are starting to place emphasis on
how global trade policies are affecting the environment; therefore another direction to
investigate the IEA dataset is to study how the trade flows and EIAs change the num-
bers of environmental agreements. All these above are challenging but worthwhile
extensions for the subsequent work.
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de producción),” Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund, pp. 159–178, 1969.
[11] Baier, S. L. and Bergstrand, J. H., “Economic determinants of free trade
agreements,” Journal of international Economics, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 29–63,
2004.
161
[12] Baier, S. L. and Bergstrand, J. H., “Do free trade agreements actually
increase members’ international trade?,” Journal of international Economics,
vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 72–95, 2007.
[13] Baier, S. L., Bergstrand, J. H., and Feng, M., “Economic integration
agreements and the margins of international trade,” Journal of International
Economics, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 339–350, 2014.
[14] Baier, Scott L and Bergstrand, Jeffrey H, “Database on economic
integration agreements (september 2015),” 2015. data retrieved from EIA
database, http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/.
[15] Barrett, S., “Self-enforcing international environmental agreements,” Oxford
Economic Papers, pp. 878–894, 1994.
[16] Becker, R. and Henderson, V., “Effects of air quality regulations on pol-
luting industries,” Journal of political Economy, vol. 108, no. 2, pp. 379–421,
2000.
[17] Bergstrand, J. H., Egger, P., and Larch, M., “Economic determinants
of the timing of preferential trade agreement formations and enlargements,”
Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper, 2010.
[18] Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S., “How much should
we trust differences-in-differences estimates?,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, pp. 249–275, 2004.
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[20] Besedeš, T. and Prusa, T. J., “The role of extensive and intensive margins
and export growth,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 96, no. 2, pp. 371–
379, 2011.
[21] Blonigen, B. A., Davies, R. B., Waddell, G. R., and Naughton, H. T.,
“Fdi in space: Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment,”
European Economic Review, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 1303–1325, 2007.
[22] Central Intelligence Agency, “The world factbook,” 2013. data retrieved
from Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
[23] Chaney, T., “Distorted gravity: the intensive and extensive margins of inter-
national trade,” The American Economic Review, vol. 98, no. 4, pp. 1707–1721,
2008.
[24] Cheng, I.-H. and Wall, H. J., “Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity
models of trade and integration,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Paper Series, no. 1999-010, 1999.
162
[25] Cheng, L. K. and Kwan, Y. K., “What are the determinants of the location
of foreign direct investment? the chinese experience,” Journal of international
economics, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 379–400, 2000.
[26] China Data Online, “China yearly macro-economics statistics(provincial),”
2014. data retrieved from All China Data Center, http://chinadataonline.
org/member/macroyr/.
[27] China Environment Yearbook Editing Committee and others,
“China environment yearbook,” China Environment Yearbook Press, Beijing,
2012.
[28] Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S., “Trade, growth, and the environment,”
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42, pp. 7–71, 2004.
[29] Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S., “Trade, tragedy, and the commons,”
American Economic Review, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 725–49, 2009.
[30] Coughlin, C. C. and Segev, E., “Foreign direct investment in china: a
spatial econometric study,” The world economy, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–23, 2000.
[31] Dean, J. M., Lovely, M. E., and Wang, H., “Are foreign investors attracted
to weak environmental regulations? evaluating the evidence from china,” Jour-
nal of Development Economics, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 1–13, 2009.
[32] Drukker, D. and Millimet, D. L., “Assessing the pollution haven hypoth-
esis in an interdependent world,” tech. rep., 2007.
[33] Eaton, J., Eslava, M., Kugler, M., Tybout, J., Becker, S., Gross-
man, G., and Hausmann, R., “The margins of entry into exports markets:
Evidence from columbia,” 2008.
[34] Eaton, J., Kortum, S., and Kramarz, F., “Dissecting trade: Firms, in-
dustries, and export destinations,” American Economic Review, vol. 94, no. 2,
pp. 150–154, 2004.
[35] Ederington, J. and Minier, J., “Is environmental policy a secondary trade
barrier? an empirical analysis,” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue cana-
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